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I. INTRODUCTION

According to white-collar defense practitioners, the demise of the corporate
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine is imminent.1 While a variety
of assaults have been identified,2 by far the most oft-cited culprit is the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), whose prosecutors, it is charged, have routinely
insisted that corporations waive these protections to secure cooperation credit and
declination of criminal action against the corporate actor and/or consideration at
sentencing.3 DOJ has, by and large, vigorously defended its policies in this regard.
Congress now threatens to inject itself into the debate: legislation entitled the
"Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act" has been introduced that would bar
federal prosecutors from asking organizations to disclose information protected by
the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine or conditioning coopera1. See, e.g., Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-FrontAssault on the
Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why it is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469 (2003); David M. Zomow & Keith D.
Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147 (2000); see also Am. College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in FederalCriminalInvestigations, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 307 (2003); Counsel
Group Assails ProsecutionPolicy Compelling Corporationsto Waive Privileges,67 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11,
at 391 (June 14, 2000); Joseph F Savage, Jr. & Melissa M. Longo, 'Waive'Goodbye to Attorney-Client Privilege,
Bus. CRIMES BULL, Oct. 2000, at 1; Breckinridge L. Willcox, Attorney/Client Privilege Waiver: Wrongheaded
Practice?,Bus. CRIMES BULL. Jan. 2000, at 1.
2. See Cole, supra note 1 passim; Counsel Group Assails Prosecution Policy Compelling Corporationsto
Waive Privileges,.supranote 1, at 391.
3. See AMERICAN CHEMIsTRY CouNcuL, ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL Er AL., THE DECLINE OF THE
ATroRNEY-CLiENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE CONTExT: SURVEY RESULTS (2006) 4 [hereinafter ACC 2006
STUDY RESULTS], available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf (mentioning, as a key theme in the
survey, the DOJ's insistence that its policies come first). For the evolving DOJ policy pronouncements, generally
issued in the form of a memorandum from the then-reigning Deputy Attorney General, see Memorandum from
Deputy Attorney General Mark R. Filip to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo], available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/05publications/05-3-p.html; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson
to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/daglcftfl
corporateguidelines.htm; Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to All Component
Heads and United States Attorneys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999)
[hereinafter Holder Memo], availableat http://www.usdoj/criminallfraudldocs/reportsl1999/chargingcorps.html,
reprinted in Justice Department Guidance on Prosecution for Corporations, 66 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA), No. 10, at
189 (Dec. 8, 1999). The SEC's cooperation policy runs a close second in the unpopularity poll. See, e.g.,
Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006) (known as
the "SEC Financial Penalties Statement"), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressI2006-4.htm; Report of Investigation
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship
of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220,
222 n.3 (Oct. 23, 2001) (known as the "Seaboard Report"), availableat http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/
34-44969.htm. Many other agencies call for voluntary corporate disclosure of statutory or regulatory violations.
See, e.g., Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice,43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1095, 1118-35 (2006).
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tion credit or civil or criminal charging decisions on whether an entity has waived
these protections (the Act does not, however, affect organizations' ability to
volunteer to waive).4 The principal aim of this article is to explain why the
proposed Act is responsive to a problem that does not exist,.and non-responsive to
the actual source of the defense bar's unhappiness. 5
The first iteration of DOJ waiver policy was set forth in a 1999 Memorandum
issued by then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder (the "Holder Memo"), which
sets forth the factors that prosecutors ought to consider in evaluating whether to
charge a corporation with a criminal offense. One of the ten factors prosecutors
were instructed to examine in making these decisions was identified as the
corporation's "cooperation and voluntary disclosure." 6 Prosecutors were instructed that they could consider, in "assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation," "the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver
of the attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect to its internal
investigation and with respect to communications between specific officers,
directors, and employees and counsel."7 The Memo explained that such waivers
4. The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007), H.R. Rep. No.
110-445, at 8 (2007). In relevant part, the Bill provides:
(b) INGENERAL- In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter, an agent or
attorney of the United States shall not(1) demand, request, or condition treatment on the disclosure by an organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, of any communication protected by the attorney-client privilege
or any attorney work product;
(2) condition a civil or criminal charging decisiodi relating to an organization, or person affiliated
with that organization, on, or use as a factor in determining whether an organization, or person
affiliated with that organization, is cooperating with the Government(A) any valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege or privilege for attorney work
product...
(3) demand or request that an organization, or person affiliated with that organization, not take any
action described in paragraph (2).
(d) VOLUNTARY DIscLOsuREs- Nothing in this Act is intended to prohibit an organization from
making, or an agent or attorney of the United States from accepting, a voluntary and unsolicited
offer to share the internal investigation materials of such organization.
The Senate version, S. 186, is virtually identical. Charles Doyle, CRS Report for Congress, The McNulty
Memorandum: Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of CorporateAttorney-Client and Work Product Protection CRS-26
(Nov. 26, 2007).
5. Until recently, few have questioned the bona fides of the bar's objections to DOJ's waiver policy. See, e.g.,
Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justice's Privilege Waiver Policy and the Death of
AdversarialJustice in CriminalInvestigations of Corporations,57 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 (2008); Daniel Richman,
Decisions About Coercion: The CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 295
(2008); Preet Bharara, CorporationsCry Uncle and their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking ProsecutorialPressure
on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CIUM. L. REv. 53, 96 (2007); Lonnie'T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HoFsTRA L.
REV. 897, 897-900 (2006).
6. Holder Memo, supra note 3, at 6.
7. Id. at 7.
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"permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and
targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements" and "are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the
completeness of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation." 8 The
Holder Memo concluded, however, that such waivers were only one consideration
and were not "an absolute requirement." 9 Finally, in a footnote, the Memo
cautioned that any waivers "should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal
advice given to the corporation concerninvestigation and any contemporaneous
10
issue."
at
conduct
the
ing
Mr. Holder's memo was updated in 2003 by then-Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson, in major part to emphasize that prosecutors ought to scrutinize
carefully the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation, but with no change to the
substance of the above-stated policy. Fairly read, the Holder/Thompson policy on
its face does not "require" or even encourage corporate privilege waivers. The
defense bar's objection, then, was not so much to the language of the policy as to
what they viewed as the policy's implicit invitation to prosecutors to "request"
privilege waivers in virtually every case-an invitation the bar contends prosecutors accepted with uniform alacrity. It is important to note that there is a serious
contest over the issue of the frequency of waiver requests. In this regard, the
government and the defense appear to be practicing in different worlds, and both
sides present surveys attesting to their particular reality.1" According to defense
practitioners, "[w]aiver of the privilege is now a routine part of discussing a
corporate resolution" of a criminal investigation.1 2 Indeed, even Mr. Holder, now
in private practice, has complained that "[tioday, it's maddening . . ... You'll go
into a prosecutor's office ... and fifteen minutes into our first meeting they say,
'Are you going to waive', 13 Predictably, DOJ responds, just as emphatically, that
its prosecutors have been judicious in requesting privilege waivers, 14 doing so only

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 7 n.2.
11. Compare, e.g., Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperationby Business Organizationsand the Impact of
PrivilegeWaivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 597-98 (2004) (discussing survey of 94 U.S. Attorneys Offices
conducted in 2002, which indicated that "requests for waivers simply are not the norm"), with ACC 2006 STUDY
RESULTS, supra note 3, passim (finding that "contrary to the claims of many prosecutors and other regulators,
privilege waiver demands are neither uncommon nor rarely exercised"), and ACC, ExEcUrIvE SUMMARY,
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL SURVEY: Is TmE ATrORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER ATrACK? (2005)

[hereinafter ACC 2005 STUDY RESULTs], available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/publichearing20050421/testimony/hackettl .pdf.
12. Savage & Longo, supra note 1, at 4.
13. See Posting of Peter Lattman to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/2006/12113/the-holder-memo/ (Dec. 13,
2006,08:47 EST).
14. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 11; Joan C. Rodgers, DOJ Official Suggests CorporateDefendants Do Not
Have to Waive Privilege But it Helps, 21 Law. Man. On Prof. Conduct (BNA) 391, 391 (July 27, 2005) (noting
Acting Assistant Attorney General John C. Richter's claim that "waiver of privilege is not a requirement and is not
a litmus test for cooperation with the government"); Philip Urofsky, Interview with United States Attorney James
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where necessary to determine the underlying facts and to test the completeness of
corporate efforts to cooperate.
Reacting to what its members viewed as an inappropriate and counterproductive assault on the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, a
self-described "Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege" commenced
an aggressive campaign for a legislative "fix": the proposed "Attorney-Client
Protection Act." The Coalition includes in its membership an impressive array of
political muscle: the American Bar Association, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the Business Roundtable, the Financial Services Roundtable, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
the Association of Corporate Counsel. This Coalition has worked hard for its bill,
and has enlisted such "A" list lawyers as former U.S. Attorneys General Richard
Thornburg and Edwin Meese to support it. The success of the Coalition in gaining
the attention of lawmakers pressured DOJ to adopt a revised policy, reflected in the
so-called "McNulty Memo," in December 2006.15 This Memo-authored by
then-Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty--continued to contemplate requests
for corporate privilege waivers, but required prosecutors to weigh identified
factors before requesting waivers, was more detailed regarding the types of
materials that could be requested, and mandated that requests16be considered (and
in some cases) approved at the highest levels of Main Justice.
The ink was barely dry on the McNulty Memo before American Bar Association
President Karen J. Mathis issued a press release stating that these guidelines "fall
far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorneyclient privilege, work product, and employee protections during government
investigations."' 1 7 A few practitioners issued faint praise, 1 8 while others expressed
significant reservations" or flat-out rejected DOJ's olive branch. 20 The Coalition
continued its lobbying and, as a consequence, the Attorney-Client Privilege
Protection Act of 2007 sailed through House committee consideration a month
B. Comey RegardingDepartmentof Justice's Policy on Requesting CorporationsUnder CriminalInvestigation to
Waive the Attorney Client Privilegeand Work ProductProtection, in CoRRATE
COUNSEL FORUM (2004), at 639,
641-42 [hereinafter Comey Remarks].
15. Jason McLure, The Life and Death of the Thompson Memo, LEGAL TIMEs,Dec. 18, 2006, available at
http:///nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews065.
16. See generally McNulty Memo, supranote 3.
17. Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis regarding revisions to the Justice Department's Thompson
Memorandum, American Bar Association, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/statement/
statement.cfm?releaseid = 59.
18. See, e.g., David Z. Seide, Email Alerts, Wilmer Hale, Department of Justice McNulty Memo Curtails
Controversial Portions of Thompson Memo-Legislation Introduced in the Senate (Dec. 13, 2006), http://
www.wilmerhale.conmpublications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=3507 (noting that "[a]s a practical matter,
the Memorandum is likely to substantially curtail privilege waiver demands from line prosecutors" principally by
placing "what appear to be meaningful hurdles in the path of any line prosecutor bent on making such demands"
in the form of DOJ approval requirements).
19. See, e.g., Abbe D. Lowell, et al., Is the DOJ's New Policy on Prosecuting CorporationsReal Reform or
Business as Usual?, LAW.COM, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsplllf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id= 1170151352731.
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after its introduction and was passed with virtually no objection three months later,
on November 12, 2007.21
Because DOJ promised to again revise its policy, potentially obviating a
legislative solution, the Senate held off on a similar bill. When DOJ was perceived
to be dragging its feet, Senator Arlen Specter, and twelve co-sponsors, introduced
on June 26, 2008 a bill similar to that passed by the House, entitled "AttorneyClient Protection Act of 2008." With this not-so-subtle reminder of congressional
concern, DOJ, in the person of Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip, finally issued
another revision of its policy in August 2008.22 This third iteration of DOJ policy
on the substance and effect of corporate "cooperation" in criminal charging
decisions in five years is now referred to as the "Filip Memo.",23 The Filip Memo
seems to simplify matters considerably, at least measured against the detailedand now apparently obsolete-guidelines and approval requirements embedded in
the McNulty policy. Its bottom line is clear: (1) privilege waivers are not (and
assertedly have never been) a prerequisite for cooperation credit or for declination
of criminal charges; (2) a corporation may freely waive its privileges if it wishes;
(3) but that waiver may not be considered -when a prosecutor decides whether to
give a corporation credit for its cooperation in charging; (4) rather, the critical
determinant is whether the entity has providedprosecutorswith thefacts necessary
for them to investigate the matterfairly and responsibly.24 Some in practice have
correctly summarized the ultimate DOJ message as: "we don't care if you waive,
just provide the relevant facts," leaving it to practitioners to sort out if and how that
can be achieved while maintaining the privilege protections.95 Although the above
appears to respond to the proposed legislation, the revised policy does not institute
Congress's proposed bar on prosecutorial requests for waivers. The policy seemingly permits prosecutors to ask for waivers of "fact" work product and privileged
communications, but it does provide that corporations "need not produce, and
prosecutors may not request," such "core" work product and attorney-client
privileged materials as attorneys' notes of witness interviews and advice given to
"as
the client concerning the legal implications of the putative misconduct at issue
26
credit."
cooperation
receive
to
eligibility
corporation's
the
for
a condition
Such is the status of the debate regarding DOJ waiver policy to date. As of this
20. See, e.g., Richard Ben-Veniste & Raj De, The "McNulty Memo": A Missed Opportunityto Reverse Erosion
ofAttorney-Client Privilege,22 LEGAL BACKGROuNDER No. 3 (Wash. Legal Found.) (Jan. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/1-19-07%20ben-veniste.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 4, at CRS-1.
22. See Filip Memo, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 10.
25. White Collar Update, Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell to Interested Persons (Sept. 5, 2008),
availableat http://www.dpw.com/1485409/clientmemos/09.05.08.Filp.Stein.Client.Memo.pdf.
26. Filip Memo, supra note 3, at 10 n.3, 11-12. This last injunction is subject to the standard exceptions: where
the advice of counsel defense is asserted; where the communications at issue are subject to the crime-fraud
exception to privilege rules; and where the conduct at issue constitutes criminal obstruction. Id. at 12.

2008]

PRIVILEGE WAIVER POLICY

1243

writing, it is too soon to judge whether DOJ's latest efforts will foreclose Senate
action on the proposed "Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008.'27 Due
to the vagaries of publishing deadlines, this article cannot await the resolution of
the DOJ-Senate stand-off. I hope this means that time remains to affect the
outcome because I believe that the participants in this lengthy controversy are
concentrating on the wrong issue. Thus, in this article, I first address at some length
whether the articulated rationale for this legislation holds weight: that is, whether
DOJ's waiver policy actually undermines the policies served by the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine in corporate investigations. Second, having
answered that question, at least preliminarily because of the absence of good
empirical data, in the negative, I will try to divine why the bar has spent so much
time and political capital insisting otherwise.
My second query may surprise, so some context should help. One might posit
that it is the type of conduct at issue here that raises the hackles of those in the bar
and on the Hill. But, as Professor Dan Richman has pointed out, waivers of all
kinds are exceedingly common in the federal criminal system. 28 Indeed, approximately 95% of federal criminal defendants (including about 90% of charged
corporations) 2 9 waive all their constitutionaltrial rights in pleading guilty every
year. Why, then, should we be particularly concerned about corporate privilege
waivers?
The element of "coercion" in these "compelled-voluntary ' 30 waivers is often
bemoaned. Yet non-white-collar criminal defendants are, with the Supreme Court's
approval, regularly required to choose between craggier rocks and more extreme
hard places, whether by statute or prosecutorial whim. Thus, the Court had no
problem upholding a plea that even it apparently recognized was extorted through
the statutory availability of a death sentence only after a jury trial. 31 Nor is it
improper prosecutorial practice to offer a defendant a deal so good that the

27. Letter from Senator Arlen Specter to Dep'y Attorney Gen. Mark Filip (July 10, 2008), available at
http://specter.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.NewsReleases&ContentRecord-id=
09ee0cfc-978b-d2cb-c6e6-5llbec8ea4ea&IsPrint=true ("I think it is asking too much for the legislative
process to await a written revision of McNulty and then await a review of the implementation of a new
memorandum ....
). The pending Senate bill, S. 3217 (replacing the 109th Congress' S. 30 and the 110th
Congress' S. 186), largely tracks the bill, H.R.3013, that passed in the House. See http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-3217. For differences between the two, see Senator Specter's floor statement,
available at http://www.acc.com/resource/getfile.php?id=9857&title= Senate +Floor+ Statement+
of+ The+ Honorable+ Arlen+ Specter+ %28R-PA%29%2C + re-introducing + S. + 186+as+The+AttorneyClient + Privilege+ Protection + Act + of+ 2008&author= &year= 2008&materialtype = no + document + type&
keywordlist=Attomey-Client+Privilege%2CCollections+%26 +Solicitations%2CCompetition&doc =true.
28. See Richman, supra note 5, passim.
29. See, e.g., ACC 2006 STUnY RESULTS, supra note 3, at 34, 40.
30. See Brown, supranote 5, at 901.
31. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may not
constitutionally complain when he determined to plead guilty, thus limiting his exposure by statute to life
imprisonment, rather than face the possibility of a capital sentence, which penalty was available only after a jury
trial. Id. at 758. The Court noted:
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innocent but risk-averse will find it virtually impossible to turn down-such as
pleading to a five year count under threat that, absent plea, the defendant may
receive a life sentence after trial. 32 Indeed, prosecutors can, and do, secure
pleas-and thus waivers of constitutional trial rights as well as the Fifth Amendment-by threatening to indict family members.3 3
In sum, requiring corporations regularly to waive their privileges in white-collar
crime cases-if that is indeed what is going on-in return for a possible
declination of prosecution seems positively benign in contrast to what goes on in
"white powder" cases. The question is not whether the corporation could be
charged-that is often a foregone conclusion under existing corporate liability
standards.34 Concededly, the language of the policy was originally not very precise
in this regard, but its implied message then (confirmed by remarks delivered by
various DOJ officials over time) and its very clear message now under the Filip
Memo is that what the government is looking for is the facts." Given that the

[E]ven if we assume that [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty except for the death
penalty provision [of the statute], this assumption merely identifies the penalty provision as a 'but
for' cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that
the plea was coerced and invalid as a voluntary act.
Id. at 750.
32. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (explaining that "the course of conduct engaged in
by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives
of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution" did not violate due process).
33. See, e.g., Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F3d 1459, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding a plea not coerced when tendered
in exchange for leniency for the rest of the defendant's family). Some assert that the corporate context is unique in
that "individual defendants do not hold sway over third parties in the way that corporations do over their
employees ....The onerous pressure upon a corporation to cooperate with a governmental investigation thus
arguably imposes an unfair hardship on one set of third parties (its employees who are criminal targets) ......
Bharara, supra note 5, at 96; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperationand the New CorporateCriminal
Procedure,82 N.Y.U. L. REv.311 (2007) (focusing on the effect of DOJ's white collar enforcement policies on
individuals). My objection to this line of analysis-which ultimately depends on the "unfairness" that the waiver
policy holds for corporate employees who mistakenly relied on the corporate attorney-client privilege and who
now face the prospect that their corporation will waive its privilege and turn their statements over to the
government-is both factual and conceptual. As noted, in cases such as Miles, third-party fall-out is not
uncommon even in individual cases, for good or ill. Second, speaking as we are now about corporate counsel,
such concerns are not competent considerations unless problems for individuals translate into concrete harm to
the health or prospects of the entity. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 5,passim.
35. See Comey Remarks, supra note 14, at 641 (contending that "[p]rosecutors are generally seeking the facts:
what happened, who did, how they did it.
Although the facts gathered by an attorney ...[may be privileged],
prosecutors are not generally seeking legal advice or opinion work product; they are just seeking facts."); see also
Buchanan, supra note 11, at 596-97. U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan asserts, for example, that
the information disclosed pursuant to a waiver is nearly always attorney work product concerning
the underlying facts, rather than privileged communications. Further, the work product protection,
as opposed to the attorney-client privilege, is not absolute, so that disclosure to a civil litigant may
be ordered upon a showing of substantial need, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3). Even with respect to work product, the government rarely seeks the attorney's mental
impressions of witness interviews. To avoid any such disclosure unnecessarily, experienced
attorneys will refrain from including mental impressions and strategy in their notes of witness
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corporation and its counsel are seeking a significant dispensation from the
government, one could legitimately argue that that dispensation need not be
cost-free, particularly if the "cost" (waiver) is intended not to punish but rather to
permit the government to get to the bottom of criminal conduct. In former Deputy
Attorney General James Comey's words, DOJ policies "do not require waiver, and
do not even require cooperation" and "for a corporation to get credit for cooperation, it must help the Government catch the crooks. 3 6
As the above may indicate, my initial reaction to the bar's vehement denunciation of compelled-voluntary waivers was to shrug it off as a specialized tempest in
a teapot. Defense counsels' objections could also be discounted as the raging of a
bar whose ox has been gored; no professional defense lawyer wishes to have an
adversary reading her work product over her shoulder or second-guessing her
judgments. Recall, too, that what is at stake here is a declination of charges against
the corporation through cooperation, and achieving this goal may well require
throwing individual members of management under the bus if they are not
cooperative with the government or have some connection to the wrongdoing.
Thus, it may often be in the corporation's best interest to volunteer a waiver, but
such waivers may disadvantage those individuals still in management who have
shared what they know with corporate counsel but do not wish that information to
be conveyed to the government (for a variety of reasons, including potential
criminal exposure). It is ultimately individuals in management, then, that are most
at risk if DOJ is successful in pressuring waivers-and not surprisingly it is the
same group that presumably has approved and promoted corporate opposition to
DOJ's waiver policy. Finally, one could certainly attribute the attention this issue
has attracted to the nature of the clients and counsel involved: these are a relatively
high-profile, politically astute, and wealthy group of possible witness/subjects/
targets and their lawyers. These folks know that if they make a big enough stink,
they at least have the opportunity to get some push-back (as, indeed, they have).3 7
What made me reconsider my first, dismissive, view, is the nature of the outrage
expressed. It is so public, so sustained, so widespread, and seemingly so sincere
that one has to take it seriously. After due consideration, I believe that the defense
objections do have weight, but not for the reasons the bar generally articulates.

interviews. while disclosure of the underlying facts may in some cases reveal some of the
questions asked of employees by counsel for the organization, any such intrusion into counsel's
mental processes is minimal.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36. Comey Remarks, supra note 14, at 641-42.
37. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 45 (May 18, 2006),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/FinalUserFrdly.pdf (eliminating, effective Nov. 1, 2006, final sentence of Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5, which stated "[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product

protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score ...unless such waiver is necessary in order to
provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization").
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Turning to the merits, then, the predominant, though not sole, a s reasoned
objection to DOJ's (and other regulators') compelled-voluntary waiver policy is
founded on the rationales underlying the attorney-client privilege and, to a lesser
extent, the work product doctrine. As Professor Lonnie Brown explains, those who
object to governmental "requests" for corporate privilege waivers primarily argue
that the "escalating pressure to waive these protections is eroding the desired
atmosphere of mutual candor and trust that has traditionally been the hallmark of
the attorney-client relationship. '39 This erosion, in turn, "is adversely affecting
counsel's desire and ability to conduct the thorough factual investigations lauded
by the Supreme Court" 40 in its leading opinion on the application of the attorneyclient privilege in the corporate internal investigation context, Upjohn Co. v.
United States.4 1 "The upshot, so4 2the argument goes, is the inevitable provision of
ineffective legal representation.'
In particular, Professor Brown identifies the "parade of horribles" envisaged by
defense lawyers to.include:
(1) the erosion of trust between attorney and client-corporate executives and
employees will cease to be forthcoming out of a fear that whatever they
communicate will ultimately be disclosed, and corporate counsel will understandably be more skeptical of the accuracy or completeness of the information
communicated to them; (2) lawyers' internal investigations will become
"paperless"-counsel will refrain from taking notes or preparing memoranda
in connection with corporate representations to avoid future provision of a
blueprint for culpability to regulators and perhaps third parties; and (3)lawyers
and clients will cease to conduct internal investigations altogether, in an effort
to evade the waiver issue entirely,
which will invariably lead to a decrease in
43
corporate legal compliance.
The first and third objections rest on the policy reasons for the attorney-client
privilege, while the second picks up the theme developed in work product cases.
To. consider seriously the wisdom of a governmental policy that relies on waiver
requests to uncover the facts and test the bonafides of corporate cooperation, then,
one must evaluate the extent to which these objections are well-founded. In
particular, one should begin by questioning the logical premise of these arguments
and of the Upjohn holding: that promoting the full and free flow of information and

38. See, e.g., William R. McLucas et al., The Decline oftheAttorney-Client Privilegein the CorporateSetting,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,622 (2006) (arguing that, over time, the erosion in the adversarial process and
skewing of the balance of power between the defense and the government "may well drive a wedge between the
corporate entity and the executives and employees the company relies upon for the shareholders' benefit, even
when these individuals have done nothing wrong"); see also sources cited supra note 1.
39. Brown, supra note 5, at 900.
40. Id.
41. 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
42. Brown, supra note 5, at 900.
43. Id. at 900-01.
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advice between client and counsel requires that otherwise relevant and probative
information should be shielded from discovery in the corporate, as well as the
individual, context. Although some have questioned whether corporations should
enjoy any attorney-client privilege, 44 those who do so are generally lonely voices
consigned to footnotes in the apparent belief that the Court is unlikely to move
from the position it adopted in Upjohn. Whether or not that is true-and I think
there is some room for doubt, as is demonstrated below-reconsidering the bases
for recognizing a corporate privilege is relevant to our evaluation of the wisdom of
DOJ's waiver policy.
If the survey results proffered by the defense bar and the prosecution regarding
the frequency of privilege waiver requests could be trusted, one might use them to
determine the likely impact of DOJ policy. It seems at least to this author, however,
that the surveys were not conducted with even minimal rigor, at least tested by the
standards required in academic circles. Certainly the surveys that the defense bar
cites ad nauseum in its lobbying materials 45 do not withstand scrutiny, a fact that
the survey authors acknowledge in footnotes but that Congress failed to pick up on
when quoting the results in the House report accompanying H.R. 3013.46 Until

44. Id. at 923 (noting that "the fundamental notion that the existence of a privilege helps to encourage clients to
seek the assistance of counsel in connection with their legal problems is less convincing in the corporate setting
because businesses 'are forced by circumstances and impelled by business necessity to resort to lawyers."')
(citation omitted); see also DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE 218 (1988) (explaining that this "standard
justification of confidentiality... is very dubious in the organizational context"); Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal
CorporateInvestigations:Legal Ethics, Professionalismand the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
859, 887 n.116 (2003) (questioning the value of privilege in the context of antitrust violations, where the
punishment for failing to self-report wrong-doing far exceeds the costs of doing so); John E. Sexton, A
Post-Upjohn Consideration of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.YU. L. REv. 443, 464 (1982)
(noting that corporate clients are "candid with their attorneys not because of privilege but because they realize that
the costs of withholding information" are far greater than the "disadvantages flowing from the risk that the
communication will later be divulged."); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,69 NoTRE DAME L. Rev. 157, 159 (1993) (disputing the typical justifications
for privilege and examining the resulting harmful consequences); Brian E. Hamilton, Note, Conflict, Disparity,
and Indecision: The Unsettled CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 629, 648 (1997)
("Government, not an evidentiary privilege, is the ultimate enforcer of government regulations."); cf Daniel R.
Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1998) (arguing for abolition of the attorney-client
privilege in general). But see Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (discussing
sources, debating the issue, and holding that corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege).
45. See, e.g., The McNulty Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism,and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
II0th Cong. 83 (2007) (statement of Richard T. White); The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to
Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 129 (2006)
(statement of Edwin Meese 11[); id. at 140-41 (statement of Richard Thomburgh); id. at 85-87 (statement of Karen
Mathis); id. at 134-35 (statement of Mark B. Sheppard).
46. Compare, e.g., ACC 2006 STUDY REsuLTs, supra note 3, at 3 n.7 ("We believe the survey's response rate
can be considered robust; but since we are not an independent surveying company or statisticians, we can make no
proffer that the sampling is statistically significant or representative of the entire profession."), with H.R. REP.
No. 110-445, at 3 (2007) (citing "recent empirical evidence" but not discussing the methods of the survey). The
authors of the survey make clear that they did not attempt a scientific sampling. Instead, they directed the survey
solely to the constituencies with the most to gain from the legislation (in-house counsel and outside counsel who
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social scientists get involved and conduct empirical studies, then, it is impossible
to know-definitively rather than anecdotally-whether compelled-voluntary waivers do indeed affect the information flow between client and counsel, the quality or
quantity of legal advice provided by lawyers, and ultimately corporate clients'
compliance with the law.
How then did I come to the "preliminary 'no" mentioned in my title? By the
only method left to us and seemingly employed by all sides in this debate:
educated guessing about the likely effects of certain rules or practices on the
reasonable client or the rational lawyer. Given the empirical uncertainties here,
much would seem to rest on the default position one adopts. I believe that the
burden of proof should lie on those seeking to defend the corporation's entitlement
to these protections for a number of reasons. The first is the old saw that sets the
default rule when examining scope of waiver claims: because the privilege
constitutes "an obstacle to the investigation of the truth," it should be "strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle."4 7
Second, and relatedly, this is an area in which important public policy concerns
pull in both directions. Whatever the cost of privilege waivers, that cost must be
weighed against whatever gains they permit in the effective identification and
remediation of corporate criminal wrongs and the efficient allocation of government resources. This piece of the equation is often ignored in the practitioners'
literature. a
Finally, while the corporate lawyer's duties run to the entity, the entity's duties
are generally said to run to the shareholders.4 9 Where do shareholders' best

are members of the ABA Business Law and Criminal Justice Section, the National Association of Defense
Lawyers and/or the Association of Corporate Counsel). Apparently, the authors did not approach academics or
government employees. ACC 2006 STUDY RESULTS, supra note 3, at 3 n.7. The responses indicated that 40% of
the in-house counsel who responded to the survey indicated that their company had been the subject of a
governmental investigation in the past five years, thus further skewing the results at least on certain queries.
"Moreover, without raw data, it is difficult to discern the degree to which those responses reflected general
perceptions rather than personal experiences." Richman, supra note 5, at 303. Finally, the questions were often
phrased in a leading manner, compromising the integrity of the survey results (and, indeed, the survey was entitled
Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?). See ACC 2006 STuDY REsuLTs, supra note 3. Given these
circumstances, it is amazing that some of the information embedded in the surveys actually undermines the
Coalition's position. For example, in its 2005 report entitled The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, the Coalition noted "roughly half of all investigations or other inquiries experienced by
survey respondents resulted in privilege waivers"-meaning, presumably, that the other half did not. ACC 2005
STUDy REsULTs, supra note 11, at 3. Indeed, the "[e]xperiences relating to waiver" reported did not support the
assertion of a near-total "culture of waiver" posited in testimony. See id. at 5-6.
47. RadiantBurners Inc., 320 F2d. at 323.
48. One of the notable exceptions being a piece authored by former prosecutors and SEC enforcement
officials. See McLucas et al., supranote 38.
49. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end."); ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other Constituency Statutes: Potentialfor Confiusion, 45 Bus. LAw. 2253,
2255 (1990) (noting that the view that the management of corporations should be pursuing shareholders' interests
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interests generally lie? Although there is no one-size-fits-all answer to this query, it
would seem to me that in the general run of cases, shareholders would be better
served if the entity were to do whatever it could-including tendering privilege
waivers-to cooperate with the government and thus secure a prompt and
hopefully positive resolution of the criminal investigation. Certainly, as will be
discussed within Part IIl.B, in particular cases the waivers necessary to achieve
this result may well be costly because they may (for example) render the
corporation more vulnerable to civil liability. But in the general run of cases I
believe one can safely assume that the costs to shareholders of the waiver will be
less than the costs of a possible criminal indictment.5 ° To the extent that the
proposed legislation helps anyone, then, it is generally not the corporations or their
shareholders; rather, it is the individuals, likely within corporate management, who
gave the lawyers the information proposed to be shared-probably to their
individual detriment-with DOJ.
I will begin, our inquiry by discussing the Supreme Court's foundational
decision in Upjohn v. United States.51 The Upjohn Court accepted, based on the
government's concession, the proposition that corporations should be able to claim
the attorney-client privilege. The Court then went on to adopt a generous view of
the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the context of internal corporate
investigations based on two key, yet unsupported, assumptions: first, that the risk
of civil or criminal liability does not suffice to ensure that corporations will
investigate allegations of wrongdoing, or at least guarantee that they will do so
effectively; and second, that the application of the privilege in this context is
necessary to induce corporate employees to provide their attorneys with information that, in the absence of the privilege, they otherwise would not.
Next, we will update Upjohn, exploring how corporate counsel conduct corporate internal investigations today; we then will be in a position to determine what
DOJ wants from corporations in the way of attorney-client privileged or work
product protected materials and the reasonableness of these expectations. My
conclusion is, if prosecutors read the Filip Memo correctly and (and were required
to follow the rules in the McNulty Memo), the instant debate is not worth having,
at least if the conversation is restricted to the wisdom of the compelled waiver
doctrine alone. What the government would seek in the usual case would be facts
to which it is often otherwise entitled under federal privilege law, and counsel
should be able to alter their investigative practices to accommodate the govern-

"has prevailed to the present. With few exceptions, courts have consistently avowed the legal primacy of
shareholder interests when management and directors make decisions"). But cf William T. Allen, Our
Schizophrenic Conceptionof the Business Corporation,14 CARDozo L. REv. 261, 281 (1992) (explaining that the
conception of the corporation is evolving to reflect the changing "nature and purpose of our social life").
50. Cf Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the CriminalLiability of Organizations,71 B.U. L. REV. 315
(1991).
51. 449 U.S. 383 (1982).
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ment's request without compromising the quality of their investigation. Further,
analysis suggests that the proposed congressional "fix" will not solve much, and
indeed may make matters worse. But we will soldier on in the certainty that the
defense bar will disagree with me about both the likelihood that prosecutors will
follow the rules, the impact of fact-related waivers on their investigative efforts,
and the wisdom of congressional intervention.
Ultimately, then, we will need to test the continuing viability of the Upjohn
reasoning. Among the questions before us are whether the Supreme Court's critical
assumptions remain valid twenty-five years after Upjohn. I will use Professor
Brown's excellent synopsis of the "parade of horribles," quoted above, to guide my
analysis. My conclusion by now may not surprise: that the traditional rationales
advanced to support the attorney-client privilege and, to a lesser degree, the work
product doctrine, simply do not apply in the corporate context in the same way
they do in the case of individuals' consultation with counsel. To the extent that the
Courts' reasoning in Upjohn ever had merit, it does not now. The defense bar's
attempt to rely on such arguments, then, must fail.
What are the implications of this conclusion? I should make clear that I am not
arguing, on this basis alone, that the defense bar has no ground for objecting to the
government's compelled-voluntary privilege waiver policy. What I am arguing is
that the bar is making the wrong argument. A fuller explication of this thesis can be
found in other literature,52 but I will briefly sketch it out in Part VI. One question
(and its answer) ought to illustrate my point: would the compelled-voluntary
privilege waiver policy have caused a stir if corporate counsel had the bargaining
leverage necessary to tell prosecutors what they can do with their waiver
"requests"? The answer, of course, is "no." The real problem lies not in the policy
so much as in the variety of circumstances that conspire to make the adversary
system a myth in the context of corporate criminal liability, including the absence
of a corporate Fifth Amendment right, the overbroad standard of liability, the
malleable nature of the federal criminal code, and the range and harshness of
sanctions applicable upon conviction. DOJ is not responsible for these circumstances, but it is happy to exploit them to ensure that its privilege waiver "requests"
are often irresistible. It is these factors that make privilege waiver "requests" a
problem, because they effectively remove corporations' ability to resist them.53
Why, then, has this particular issue galvanized the bar? Because privilege
waivers are, quite simply, the last straw. As will be demonstrated infra, public

52. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 5, passim; O'Sullivan, supra note 5, passim
53. See, e.g., Memorandum from John R Savarese & David B. Anders, Attorneys, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, &
Katz LLP, DOJ Adopts Revised Polices on Corporate Prosecution (Dec. 13, 2006) (noting that "nothing in the
McNulty memo changes the fundamental principle that corporations are liable, in virtually all cases, for criminal
misconduct by their employees. Thus, prosecutors will continue to have enormous leverage over corporations and
corporations will, in turn, continue to have powerful incentives to try to appear as cooperative as possible to
prosecutors"), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documentstwachtell 121306.pdf.
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corporations generally must investigate material allegations of wrongdoing. Lacking a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, they do so through
counsel because lawyers' work is shielded from discovery by government agents.
These protections give corporations the breathing space to decide whether wrongdoing has indeed occurred, attempt to halt and remediate it, and determine how
they propose to deal with the information garnered-that is, by resisting government inquiries or, as is more usual given the above-described circumstances,
attempting to cooperate with the government. When DOJ demands that these
protections be waived, there is no more room for resistance; counsel's work
product will provide DOJ-and potentially others-with a roadmap to corporate
liability.
Certainly, the public interest is served when the government is able efficiently
and effectively to allocate its investigatory resources in fighting corporate crimethe interest claimed to be served by DOJ's cooperation and waiver policies. But the
defense bar would tell you that this is not the only value worth considering-that
the adversarial process is as critical in corporate cases as in individual cases, for a
variety of reasons. It must be acknowledged that not every government investigation is worthy and not every theory of corporate liability is sound. Sometimes,
then, push-back by the corporation may actually serve the public interest, especially when one considers the considerable consequences of an overzealous or
unwise prosecution. The stakes are often very high both in terms of dollars and in
the effect that criminal or regulatory action can have on the livelihood and lives of
countless innocent persons, including blameless employees and shareholders.
In short, my belief is that these privileges have assumed the job of the Fifth
Amendment in the context of corporate investigations: they are virtually the last
means by which corporations can resist government efforts to impose potentially
ruinous liability on corporate actors, whether or not such consequences are
warranted. It is these circumstances, I suggest, that both account for the bar's
full-throated roar in objection to DOJ policy and for the reason why we should take
it seriously.
II. UPJOHN Co. V UNITED STATES

Upjohn Company's independent auditors informed the company's general
counsel, Gerard Thomas, that one of the company's foreign subsidiaries had made
questionable payments (i.e., bribes) to foreign government officials to secure
government business. After consulting with the chairman of Upjohn's board and
outside counsel, Thomas launched an internal investigation; later, a magistrate
found that this factual investigation was launched "to determine the nature and
extent of the questionable payments and to be in a position to give legal advice to
the company with respect to the payments. 5 4 Thomas sent questionnaires, over the

54. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981) (emphasis original).
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chairman's signature, to'all foreign managers seeking detailed information regarding the questioned payments. His communications noted that several American
companies had made "'possibly illegal' payments to foreign government officials," emphasized that management needed full information regarding any such
payments made by Upjohn, and identified Upjohn's general counsel as the person
chosen by the Chairman to conduct an internal investigation into the matter.55 The
chairman directed that managers were to treat the investigation as "highly
confidential," were not to discuss it with anyone other than the Upjohn employees
who might be helpful in responding to the questions presented, and ordered that
responses be sent directly to Thomas. 56 Thomas and outside counsel also interviewed many current and former employees as part of the investigation.57 Pursuant
to the Upjohn Chairman's orders, the responses to the questionnaires and counsel's
notes of the interviews were "treated as confidential material and [were] not ...
disclosed to anyone except Mr. Thomas and outside counsel. 58
The reason Upjohn found itself fighting to retain the confidentiality of these
materials was that, after concluding that it had a disclosure obligation, Upjohn had
filed a preliminary report with the SEC, copied to the IRS, disclosing questionable
payments totaling $2,710,000 in 22 of the 136 countries served by the company
over a five-year period (the illegal payments for this span of time were eventually
estimated at over $4 million). 59 The IRS began investigating the tax consequences
of the payments. 6° Although Upjohn gave the IRS a list of all employees who had
been interviewed and who had responded to the questionnaire, 6 ' the IRS wanted
more.62 The government clearly felt that Upjohn was limiting the extent of
information and access provided in order to shield itself from a full IRS accounting
regarding the payments. The IRS therefore issued a summons to the company
calling for the production of the "written questionnaires sent to managers of
[Upjohn's] foreign affiliates, and memorandums or notes of the interviews conducted in'
the United States and abroad with officers and employees" of Upjohn
and its subsidiaries.6 3 Upjohn declined to produce these materials, claiming that
they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine. 64 And so the litigation commenced.
As an initial matter, the Upjohn Court did not examine de novo whether

55. Id. at 386-87.
56. Id. at 387.
57. See id. at 387, 394 n.3.
58. Id. at 395 n.5.
59. Brief for the United States and Federal Respondent at 4, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1980)
(No. 79-886), 1980 WL 339280 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
60. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 387 (1981).
61. Id.
62. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 6.
63. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387-88.
64. Id. at 388.
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corporations should be entitled to claim an attorney-client privilege; rather, it
relied on the government's concession and moved on. 65 One could argue that the
government's concession was too hasty. After all, although the Court has found
that corporate "persons" are entitled to claim many constitutional rights,66 it has
also denied such "persons" the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination-a critical right in criminal cases. 67 Further, it did so based in major part on
the supposition that a contrary ruling would effectively frustrate governmental
efforts to enforce the criminal laws against corporations. 68 Certainly a nonfrivolous argument could be made to similar effect in this context. Even if one
were to concede that corporations should have the benefit of the privilege in civil
litigation, one could argue that, at least in criminal investigations, corporations,
like governmental actors, 69 should not be able to hide crimes behind this evidentiary privilege.
The government elected to make a more circumscribed argument. Where its
employees have acted in a way to expose the corporation to liability, the
government argued, corporations will investigate allegations of wrongdoing whether
or not the privilege applies: "'the potential costs of undetected noncompliance are
themselves high enough to ensure that corporate officials will authorize investigations regardless of an inability to keep such investigations completely confidential."' 7 The facts in Upjohn itself were advanced as a good example of this
dynamic. "At the time Upjohn initiated this investigation, the scope of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context was unsettled. Thus, the corporation had no guarantee that the information provided by the lower-level employees

65. Id. at 390.
66. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the ConstitutionalRights of Corporationsin Criminal Prosecutions,63 TENN. L. REV. 793, 803-04,
806 (1996); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41 HAsTINGs L.J.
577, 578, 580-81 (1990).
67. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906).
68. Many have pointed to passages in the Hale opinion that indicate that the Court's decision was dictated by
pure practical exigency. See, e.g., Mitchell Lewis Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business
Documents, 56 U. CiN. L. REV. 387, 394 (1987) (arguing that the Hale decision "is animated almost entirely by
social control concerns"). For example, after concluding that appellants, as agents, could not assert the rights of
their corporate principal for Fifth Amendment purposes, the Hale Court reasoned:
As the combination or conspiracies provided against by the Sherman Anti Trust Act can ordinarily
be proved only by the testimony of the parties thereto, in the person of their agents or [employees],
the privilege claimed would practically nullify the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it be
for the legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial power may close the door
of access to every available source of information upon the subject?
Hale, 201 U.S. at 70.
69. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
112 F.3d 910. 915 (8th Cir. 1997); see also In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000-02, 288 F.3d 289,
292-94 (7th Cir. 2002).
70. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 30 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 E2d
1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1979)).
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was protected
by the attorney-client privilege. The investigation nevertheless
71
proceeded.,
Finally, the Solicitor General rejected the company's argument that, in absence
of a broad privilege, corporate counsel "'will be uncomfortably aware that any
information he elicits [from a lower-ranking employee] might later be used against
the corporation or employee by an adversary' and, hence, 'will be hesitant to probe
deeply.' ' 72 Even in the absence of the absolute protection afforded by the
attorney-client privilege, the Solicitor General noted, communications with counsel and corporate employees would be protected by the qualified work product
privilege.73 Second, and in all events,
a guarantee of secrecy does not establish or narrow an attorney's obligation in
the giving of legal advice to his client. If an attorney is to fulfill his ethical
obligation to the corporation to which he is rendering legal advice, he should
resolve any fear he may have of disclosure in favor of a complete and
comprehensive investigation. A claim that attorneys will ignore their ethical
obligations to their clients in the absence of the protection of the attorneyclient privilege is poor justification indeed for an extension of the privilege.7 4
The Upjohn Court's response to this argument is summary and completely
unsatisfying. Rejecting the Solicitor General's contention that "the risk of civil or
criminal liability suffices to ensure that corporations will seek legal advice in the
absence of the protection of the privilege, ' 75 the Court stated first that the
government's position "ignore[d] the fact that the depth and quality of any
investigations, to ensure compliance with the law would suffer, even were they
undertaken."7 6 Second, the Court noted that a similar argument could be made
with respect to individuals, yet "the common law has recognized the value of the
privilege in further facilitating communications. 77 This, then, is the first criticaland highly contestable-assumption upon which the Court validated the application of the attorney-client privilege in the context of internal corporate investigations: that, absent the privilege, corporations will not seek counsel's assistance
when wrongdoing is uncovered, or at least that investigations would not be as
complete or careful were they unprotected by privilege.
The Court's other critical assumption is revealed in its analysis of the "test" that
ought to apply when measuring corporate privilege assertions. Prior to the Court's

71. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 31. It is worth noting in this respect that the investigation was
in part prompted by petitioner's desire to participate in the SEC's voluntary disclosure program. Id. at 31 n.20.
72. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 35, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), 1980
WL 339279 (No. 79-886))..
73. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 32.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 n.2 (1981).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Upjohn decision, the circuits had been split on the question of how to conceptualize the application of privilege rules when the allegedly protected communications
are between counsel and corporate employees. The Sixth Circuit in Upjohn
adopted the "control group" test for measuring the scope of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context, reasoning that only corporate management
possesses "an identity analogous to the corporation as a whole.",7 8 Put another way,
the "control group" "is (or personifies) the corporation" in communicating with
counsel.7 9 Under this approach, communications with counsel were protected if
initiated by corporate management; ° thus, "only those communications made by
the so-called 'control group' of the corporation, namely, those officers, usually top
management, who play a substantial role in deciding and directing the corporation's response to the legal advice given" were privileged from disclosure. 1
Where communications were made to counsel by subordinate corporate employees, such communications were not subject to the attorney-client privilege,
although they would be protected under the work product doctrine. Accordingly,
the Sixth Circuit remanded, instructing the district court to determine who was
within Upjohn's "control group."8 2 A competing test used in other circuits, called
the "subject-matter" approach, dictated that where a corporate agent-whether in
management or in some subordinate position within the entity-is "in possession
of information acquired in the ordinary course of business relating to the subject
matter of his employment, and the information is communicated confidentially to
corporate counsel to assist him83in giving legal advice to the corporation, then the
communication is privileged.
The United States made a strong pitch for the adoption of the "control group"
test. The Solicitor General's brief in this respect is worth in-depth discussion
because if it was arguable then, it is, in my view, indisputable now. The United
States argued that "'since the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the factfinder, it applies only' where necessary to achieve its
purpose. Accordingly, it protects only those disclosures-necessary to obtain
84
informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege."
In the corporate internal investigations context, the government argued, the
company had not demonstrated that these communications would not have been
made absent the privilege.85 The government contended that "the attorney-client
privilege did not play any part in encouraging Upjohn's employees to make the

78. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
79. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F Supp. 483,485 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
80. Upjohn, 600 F.2d at 1226.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1227-28.
83. Id. at 1226; see Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609-11 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc).
84. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 26 (emphasis added) (quoting. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391,403 (1976)).
. 85. Brief for the United States, supranote 59, at 14, 26.
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required disclosures; they did so in compliance with an order issued to them in the
corporate chain of command., 86 The United States further reasoned that because
the privilege belongs to the corporation, and the corporation can waive the
privilege regardless of the witness' consent, "such employees could not depend
upon any assurance of confidentiality conferred by the privilege because, in fact,
there is none from their standpoint., 8 1 Clearly, the "destiny" of employee communications "necessarily rests in the hands of the control group; and, like them, the
corporation's counsel owes his professional loyalty to his corporate client rather
than to the individual non-control group employees."88 As the Solicitor General
summarized:
[Tihe subordinate employee's willingness to cooperate with corporate counsel
is therefore solely a function of his deference to the corporate chain of
command and bears no relationship to the availability of the attorney-client
privilege. Since extension of the attorney-client privilege to protect the
employees' communications would not achieve its purpose of encouraging
89
candid disclosure, the privilege should not apply to such evidence.
While the Upjohn Court "decline [d] to lay down a broad rule or series of rules to
govern all conceivable future questions in this area," 90 it clearly rejected the
''control group" test as inconsistent with the underlying rationale for the privilege
and, in particular, with the type of free flow of information contemplated by the
privilege: "the privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice
to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice." 91 The Court ignored the Solicitor
General's discussion, concluding without any apparent basis of support that "[t]he
control group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of
the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by
employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation. '92 The Court's rejection of the "control group" test, then, is founded
on another critical-and, again, unsupported-assumption: that corporate employees outside the control group would not frankly and fulsomely provide counsel
with needed information unless the corporation'sattorney-clientprivilege covered
their communications.
For purposes of later analysis, it is worth noting that the Court also rejected the'
argument that its ruling would impose a "broad 'zone of silence' over corporate
affairs," noting that the "privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 392.
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does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated
with the attorney.",93 The Upjohn Court concluded-as we shall see, again in
error-that the government could interview the persons identified by Upjohn if it
wished and thus that it was in "no worse position than if the communications had
never taken place." 94
Like courts using the "subject-matter test," then, the Upjohn Court held that,
where corporations conduct an internal investigation in the manner Upjohn did in
that case, communications from non-management employees to counsel would be
protected, as well as legal advice tendered by counsel to non-control group
members. This holding, the Court determined, disposed of the case so far as "the
responses to the questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview
questions are concerned. '95 The attorney-client privilege ruling did not, however,
resolve the entire dispute.
The Upjohn Court also felt that it had to reach the question of the applicability of
the work product doctrine because Thomas had testified that "his notes and
memoranda of interviews go beyond recording responses to his questions. 96 He
described these notes as containing
what I considered to be the important questions, the substance of the responses
to them, my beliefs as to the importance of these, my beliefs as to how they

related to the inquiry, my thoughts as to how they related to other questions. In
some instances, they might even suggest other
questions that I would have to
97
ask or things that I needed to find elsewhere.
The government had asserted that, under the Court's first affirmation of the work
product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor,98 as incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3), it had "made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome"
work product protections.9 9 The Court ruled that Hickman and Rule 26 afford

special protection to work product that reveals "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney"' 1 ° -what is commonly referred to
as "opinion work product."
The Court ruled that if Thomas's notes
reveal[ed] communications, they [were], in this case, protected by the attorneyclient privilege. To the extent that they [did] not reveal communications, they
reveal[ed] the attorney's mental processes in evaluating the communications.
As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work product cannot be disclosed
93. Id. at 395.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 397.
96. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981).
97. Id. at 400 n.8.
98. 329 U.S: 495 (1947).
99. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399.
100. Id. at 400.
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substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent
simply on a showing of 10
without undue hardship. '

The Court pointed out that some courts have concluded that "no showing" of
necessity is sufficient to explode the protections of opinion work product, but
ultimately declined to articulate a test, noting only that "we think a far stronger
showing of necessity and unavailability by other means than was made by the
by the Magistrate in this case would be necessary to
Government or applied
' 10 2
disclosure."
compel
III. ITrERNAL CORPORATE

INVESTIGATIONS'

03

A. The Investigation
The Upjohn investigation was cutting-edge at the time; since then, internal
corporate investigations have become commonplace, whether required by law' ° 4

101. Id. at 401.
102. Id. at 401-02.
103. For an excellent and comprehensive volume on this subject, see DAN K. WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE
INTERNAL INVEsTIGATIONs (2008). Many practitioners have also published articles discussing how internal
corporate investigations are conducted. I have included here cites to just a portion of this literature; it constitutes a
fairly random snapshot of practitioners' views (which are remarkably consistent) in 2006-07. See, e.g., Thomas R.
Mulroy & Eric J. Mufioz, The Internal CorporateInvestigation, 1 DEPAuL Bus. & Comm. L.J. 49 (2002) (authors
attorneys at Mulroy Scandaglia Marrinson Ryan); Daniel H. Bookin et al., Obstruction of Justice Under
Computer Associates: Legal, Tactical and Ethical Implicationsfor Attorneys Conducting InternalInvestigations,
1564 PLI/CoRP. 259 (2006) (authors attorneys at O'Melveny & Myers LLP); Andrew J. Ceresney, et al., The
Attorney-Client Privilege and Internal Investigations: Privilege Issues in Structuring an Investigation and
Interviewing Witnesses, 163 PLI/NY 207 (2006) (authors attorneys at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP); Timothy J.
Coleman & Christine Y. Chi, Internal Investigations: Who, What, When, Why and How, 1561 PLI/Co,. 265
(2006) (author attorney at Dewey Ballantine LLP); Sheila Finnegan, The First 72 Hours of a Government
Investigation:A Guide to Identifying Issues andAvoiding Mistakes, 1571 PLI/CoRp. 901 (2006) (author attorney
at Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP); Hector Gonzalez, Conducting Internal Corporate Investigations, 1571
PLI/CoRp. 881 (2006) (author attorney at Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP); Nancy Kestenbaum & Jason P.
Criss, Credit Where Credit is Due? The Role of Internal Investigations in the Outcome of Government
Investigations, 1564 PLI/Colt,. 121 (2006) (authors attorneys at Covington & Burling LLP); Aaron R. Marcu,
InvestigatingIndicationsof Wrongdoing: Necessary and Properin the Post-EnronEra, 1564 PLI/CoRP. 199, 202
(2006) (author attorney at Covington & Burling LLP); John A. Reding & Edward Han, The Horns of a Dilemma:
Coerced Waivers in the Name of "Cooperation", 1557 PLI/CoRP. 445 (2006) (authors attorneys at Paul, Hastings,
Janofsky & Walker LLP); Paul D. Sarkozi, Internal Investigations:An Overview of the Nuts and Bolts and Key
Considerationsin Conducting Effective Investigations, 1564 PLI/CoRp. 95 (2006) (author attorney at Hogan &
Hartson LLP); Jonathan R. Tuttle & Emily S. Pierce, Navigating the "Minefield": Avoiding EthicalPitfalls and
Other Liabilities in Conducting Internal Investigations, 1557 PLI/CoRP. 465 (2006) (authors attorneys at
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP); Kenneth B. Winer, et al., Internal Investigationsand the ForeignCorruptPractices
Act, 1588 PLI/CoRp. 28, 302 (2007) (author attorneys at Foley & Lardner LLP); Bruce E. Yannett, Conducting
InternalInvestigations, 1571 PLI/CoRP. 947 (2006) (author attorney at Debevoise & Plimpton LLP); Marjorie J.
Peerce & Peggy M. Cross, Independent Corporate Investigations, Bus. CRIMES BuLL., Jan. 2007, at 1 (authors
attorneys at Stillman & Shaw); Jeffrey Thomas & Susan T. Stead, Attorney-Client Privilege and Confidentiality
Issues in Internal and External Investigations, THE BRIEF, Summer 2006, at 13 (authors attorneys at Mitchell
Williams Selig Gates Woodyard, PLLC and Nelson, Levine, deLuca & Horst, respectively).
104. See infra notes 189-192 and accompanying text.
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or by corporate imperatives. 10 5 Some investigations are commissioned as a
prophylactic matter, but most are triggered by some circumstance that hints at
corporate malfeasance, such as questionable stock trading, irregularities discovered during audits, anonymous tips, customer complaints, regulatory inspections,
and, of course, the service of civil complaints or criminal grand jury subpoenas.
Such circumstances are not always sufficiently serious to require the commitment
of time and resources consumed by a lawyer-led investigation. And investigations
can in some cases, as is discussed further below, render the corporation more
vulnerable to civil, if not criminal, liability rather than less. Nevertheless, according to much of the practice-oriented literature, "the internal investigation has
become the standard of care whenever credible
allegations of significant miscon10 6
duct are raised in organizational settings."
Some internal corporate investigations will, like Upjohn's, be conducted by
in-house counsel. Increasingly, however, large-scale or particularly sensitive
investigations are conducted by outside counsel from a law firm expert in such
inquiries. 107 A variety of circumstances are identified as relevant to this choice, but
two stand out.
First, because it lacks a Fifth Amendment privilege, a corporation can protect
the results of its investigation-at least until it chooses how it will act on the
report-only by using lawyers who can shield their work under the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine. Invocation of the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine obviously must be based on the provision of legal
services. 10 8 "To the extent that an internal corporate investigation is made by
management itself, there is no attorney-client privilege, and by the same token, no
work-product protection." 10 9 Thus, the investigation must be pursued for the
purpose of securing legal advice (attorney-client) or done in anticipation of
litigation (work product). While these rules are clear enough, their application may
not be in the case of in-house counsel. In their case, "legal and business
considerations may frequently be inextricably intertwined."' 110 "[B]ecause of their
unique position as both lawyers and employees of the corporation, in-house
counsel are often called upon to provide business advice as well as legal counsel
.... [Therefore] communications with in-house counsel have been subjected to
105. See, e.g., Duggin, supra note 44, at 871-883 (tracing evolution of the internal corporate investigation);
McLucas, et al., supra note 38, at 624-29.
106. Duggin, supranote 44, at 886.
107. See, e.g., Marcu, supra note 103, at 3; Peerce & Cross, supra note 103, at 1 (noting that "[iun this age of
regulatory and prosecutorial focus on corporate compliance, companies increasingly are relying on special
outside counsel to conduct internal corporate investigations into potential wrongdoing").
108. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 9, 2001, 179 F Supp. 2d 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that lawyers representing Marc Rich in connection with his presidential pardon application could not rely
on the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege to withhold testimony or documentary evidence because
they were not "providing legal services in an adversarial context").
109. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
110. Coleman v. Am. Broad. Co.. 106 F.R.D. 201. 206 (D.D.C. 1985).
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stricter and more skeptical scrutiny than similar communications with outside
counsel." 1
112
Second, at least when the investigation is announced publicly, as it often is,
the company is hoping to reassure a number of constituencies beyond criminal
prosecutors regarding the corporation's remediation of the problem. For example,
"[o]ne of the company's primary goals in retaining investigatory counsel is to
conduct a fair, thorough and complete investigation so it can assure investors,
regulators and employees that it has discovered the extent of any problems that
exist and has a plan not only to correct them but to prevent their recurrence."' " 3 As
Marjorie Peerce notes,
Whether the company succeeds in providing these assurances depends in
significant part on the degree of confidence these groups have in the outside
counsel conducting the investigation. One thing is certain: unless they trust
that the investigation was truly an independent one, they are not likely to have
faith in the outcome. Such a lack of faith can have devastating consequences
for the company: valuable employees distrustful of management may leave,
investors may pull their support, and regulators may disregard the results of the
internal investigation and decide to conduct their own, disrupting the company
and further undermining the investing public's faith in it. And if regulators feel
that the investigation was deliberately compromised by the lack of independence, they
may decide to investigate the company and its senior management
114
further.
Ensuring the appearance of "true" independence often translates into hiring an
outside firm to conduct the internal investigation under the control and instruction
of the Board of the company or one of its subcommittees.
If the entity decides to engage an outside law firm to conduct the investigation,
outside counsel and corporate representatives-usually the Board or a committee
thereof-must decide on the appropriate scope of the proposed investigation and
preliminarily, at least, discuss how the results are to be presented to the Board. The
lawyers must then begin their work, and quickly. If the government.has not yet
shown an interest in the subject-matter, counsel will want to get ahead of the curve,
111. H. Lowell Brown, The Crime-FraudException to the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Context of
Corporate Counseling, 87 Ky. L.J. 1191, 1207-09 (1998-99); see also Todd Presnell, A Higher Standard:
ClaimingAttorney-Client Privilege is Tougherfor In-House Counsel, Bus. L. TODAY, May/June 2005, at 19.
112. See, e.g., Peerce & Cross, supra note 103, at 6.
A company that retains outside counsel to investigate potential misconduct is likely to have
announced the retention and possibly the scope of the investigation in a press release aimed at
reassuring investors and regulators that the company has the situation under control. At the
conclusion of the investigation, the company may issue another press release describing counsel's
conclusions and outlining actions it plans to take in response.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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so she can advise the company how to mitigate adverse consequences. If the
government is on the case, the time pressures are magnified. There may be a rush
to the courthouse among potential cooperators; certainly the benefits yielded by
cooperation either at the charging phase or at sentencing decline with each passing
day.
Internal investigations generally focus on two categories of information: document review (including review of computer records and financial data) and
interviews of corporate employees and other agents. Generally, counsel will try1 to
15
piece together the facts from the documents and then interview witnesses.
Because the corporation cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege to resist
government subpoenas duces tecum, and because mere review by a lawyer of
pre-existing, unprivileged documents does not confer upon those documents
attorney-client-privileged or work product status, documentary proof generally
cannot be shielded from disclosure (although lawyers may claim as protected work
product their own choice, categorization, or organization of the key documents).
Witness interviews present a variety of challenges, many of which flow from the
fact that counsel's ethical duties are owed to the entity itself, not to any of its
constituencies-whether those constituencies are the Board, shareholders, or
members of management.' 1 6 "That notwithstanding, legal constructs are notoriously difficult to reach on the phone, and they are highly unreliable about
appearing at meetings. Thus, a lawyer representing a corporation must of necessity
communicate with-and receive direction from-the client through its officers,
directors, and employees." T1 7 Counsel may find themselves in the awkward position of interrogating the very management with whom they are coordinating their
investigation or the board members who engaged them on behalf of the entity.
Of great (if unquantifiable) concern to those conducting internal investigations
is the question of the effect of the internal investigation-and how it is conducted--on employees' morale and their trust in and loyalty to the entity. On the
one hand, a number of factors (including DOJ's cooperation policy) may dictate
that corporate counsel advise the entity to play hard-ball with employees (whose
culpability, of course, is not proven at this point) by firing those who refuse to
cooperate with them or the government. On the other hand, the corporation and its
lawyers must be very careful how they treat employees or the fall-out in terms of
intangibles like morale, trust, and loyalty; perceived heavy-handedness or "unfairness" may convince some valued employees to jump ship or move culpable

115. See, e.g., Finnegan, supra note 103, at 928 (stating, with respect to employee interviews, that "[w]hen
possible, key documents should be reviewed beforehand as long as this will not unduly delay the interviews").
116. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 (2004); William W. Horton, A Transactional
Lawyer's Perspectiveon the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Jeremiadfor Upjohn, 61 Bus. LAW. 95, 97 (Nov. 2005)
(stressing that "[w]here a lawyer represents a corporation, he or she owes professional duties to the entity and not
to any officer, director, employee, or shareholder or other constituent thereof").
117. Horton, supra note 116, at 97.
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employees to run to cooperate with the government. The entity's interest, then, lies
in maximizing the information flow while minimizing the extent to which counsel,
in pumping the well, alienate those from whom they are seeking evidence. Finally,
counsel face the inevitable challenge of inducing employees to trust them enough
to talk to them fully and frankly.
The results of witness interviews are protected under federal law, which is
critical in that these interviews are "the heart of the internal investigation," through
which documentary "words and numbers come to life through the stories related
by real people."' 1 8 First, at least under Upjohn, the communications made by
corporate employees (of any rank)'to counsel in furtherance of their employer's
request for legal advice are protected from compelled disclosure by the attorneyclient privilege. Second, to the extent that counsel memorializes employee
interviews in a debriefing memorandum, that memo is protected attorney work
product.
Counsel will also likely produce, during the course of an internal investigation, a
variety of what can best be characterized as analytical or summary work product.
One of the first tasks facing counsel will be to get a sense of the organizational
hierarchy (perhaps reflected in a chart to memorialize counsel's findings or witness
interview schedule) and to prepare a chronology of the relevant events (based on
documents and witness interviews and probably annotated with references to the
same). Counsel may catalog (perhaps in a computer program) "key" documents
and other smoking guns. Certainly, counsel will prepare agendas for meetings,
questions for various witnesses, "to do" lists of all sorts, and summary documentation regarding what has been learned and what remains to be uncovered. Legal
memos regarding possibly applicable law will be commissioned. Finally, counsel
will likely write debriefing memos to memorialize, and analyze, all interactions
with government investigators. All this, if kept confidential, is protected- work
product.
At the conclusion of the investigation, a report in some form is generally
rendered to the corporate client, whether in an oral presentation or a written
summary of some sort. The report will summarize at greater or lesser length what
counsel discovered after reviewing the documents and interviewing the relevant
corporate agents. Note that these reports may make reference to the content of
interviews with employees and may contain lawyers' assessments of credibility
and the like, although they are unlikely to contain the lawyers' actual debriefing
memos. The report may include some material reflecting counsel's analytical work
product (e.g., charts, identification of "key" documents, a form of chronology).
Counsel's report will also generally contain prospective advice, such as recommended steps the corporation might take to remediate any wrongdoing or to
prevent future missteps. If, as is often the case, the corporation fears imminent

118. Duggin, supra note 44, at 864.
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regulatory or prosecutorial scrutiny of the relevant events, the report may suggest a
course of action to reduce the corporation's exposure. Where a government
investigation has not yet been launched, counsel will have to deal with the
agonizing issue of whether the corporation should self-report; where an investigation has been launched, the corporation will need to quickly decide whether to
cooperate with relevant authorities.11 9 Again, should a prosecutor seek to subpoena
any written reports or records of the investigation, the corporation could not resist
on Fifth Amendment grounds. These reports are, however, presumptively procommunications under the attorney-client privilege and
tected from disclosure as 120
as attorney work product.
The protected nature of such reports is critical because, absent such protection,
the internal investigative report may well provide prosecutors and regulators with
a roadmap to liability. Counsel will have done the government's document and
computer review for it-often a huge task-and identified the important needles in
the haystack. They will have gathered the statements of the relevant witnesses, at
least some of whom may choose not to speak to government agents at all. With
these materials, the government also will have the expert assessment of experienced criminal counsel regarding the corporation's likely exposure under federal
law.
B. "Selective" Waiver
There is another consequence of exposing investigative findings to government
agents which is not of DOJ's making but which is said to exacerbate the unfairness
of its waiver policy: the disclosure of protected materials to the government will
probably result in a waiver of any privilege as to other persons-such as civil
plaintiffs, shareholders pursuing shareholder derivative actions, and state regulators-seeking disclosure of the same materials for purposes of civil litigation. The
most serious over-arching concern with regard
corporate bar often cites this as "the
121
to compelled-voluntary waiver.'
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, all the circuits to consider the issue
except the Eighth Circuit have rejected a "selective" waiver theory. They have
ruled that where otherwise privileged materials are shown to third-parties--either
in an attempt to head off regulatory or criminal, action against the corporation, in
the course of the corporation's business, or in the conduct of litigation-the
122
protections of the attorney-client privilege are waived as to any other person.
Only the Eighth Circuit has adopted a limited doctrine of "selective" waiver
whereby voluntary disclosure to a government agency constitutes a waiver of the

119.
120.
121.
122.

See, e.g., Marcu, supranote 103, at 206.
See, e.g., Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 1, at 152.
Brown, supra note 5, at 947.
See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l. Inc., 450 E3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).
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123
attorney-client privilege only as to that agency.
Under the work product doctrine, exposure of protected materials to third parties
does not automatically waive the doctrine's protection. 124 "[A] party who discloses
documents protected by the work-product doctrine may continue to assert the
doctrine's protection only when the disclosure furthers the doctrine's underlying
goal."1 25 Generally, this inquiry turns on whether the disclosure was made to one
deemed an "adversary," in which case work product protection is lost, or whether it
is turned over to one with a "common interest" under circumstances that indicate a
legitimate expectation of continued confidentiality, in which case the work product
protections will be sustained. 126 Where the disclosing party knows that an
investigation is ongoing by the recipient entity, that will certainly suffice to
demonstrate an adversary relationship.12 7 All the circuits to consider this issue
have rejected a "selective" waiver theory or a "fairness" analysis. They hold that
disclosure of work
product to one adversary is sufficient to waive the doctrine as to
128
all adversaries.
The government, recognizing that this dynamic is a roadblock to access to
privileged materials, has entered into confidentiality agreements that purport, by
contract, to institute a "selective waiver" policy. The SEC has been particularly
active in this area, though DOJ, too, has sometimes tried to accommodate
cooperating companies in this regard. 129 Again, the problem is (mostly) the courts.
Although the law is unsettled as to the significance of an express assurance of
confidentiality by the government agency to which the original disclosure was
made,1 30 it is fair to say that courts generally have not been sympathetic.

123. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (attorney-client
privilege not waived as to civil plaintiff where documents had been voluntarily disclosed to SEC).
124. See United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 687 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997).
125. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1429 (3d Cir. 1991).
126. See, e~g., MIT, 129 F.3d at 687; In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 234-36 (2d Cir. 1993).
127. See SteinhardtPartners,9 F.3d at 234; Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428.
128. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428-29.
129. See, e.g., Thomas & Stead, supra note 103, at 15; For example, the SEC has supported federal legislation
that would permit a selective waiver by persons who wish to make disclosures to the SEC, so that disclosure to the
SEC is not considered a waiver as to any other party. See Section 4 of the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor
Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. § 4 (introduced May 21, 2003); Prepared Testimony of Mr.
Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC, before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises (June 5, 2003), available at www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
060503tssmc.htm.
130. For example, the D.C. and Third Circuits have held that even an express agreement by the government
agency to preserve the confidentiality of the disclosures offers no protection against waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426-27; Permian Corp. v. United States,,665 F.2d 1214, 1219-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1981). The D.C. Circuit, however, has upheld a disclosing party's claim of work product protection because
an agreement with the SEC established a protective attitude of confidentiality which demonstrated the disclosing
party's intent to preserve its work product as against another government "adversary." See Permian,665 F.2d at
1217-19; see also In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1374 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Second Circuit
has also indicated that an express assurance of confidentiality by the government agency would bar a finding of
waiver in the work product context. See Steinhardt Partners,9 F.3d at 236. The Third Circuit, by contrast, has
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In 2006, an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was proposed, which
stated that
in a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client or work product protection-when made to
a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative,
or enforcement authority-does not operate as a waiver of31 the privilege or
protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities.'
In April 2007, after noting that this proposed revision to Rule 502 was "adamantly
opposed by bar groups and private lawyers" but "enthusiastically favored by
government offices and agencies," the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
decided to drop the provision on selective waiver. 132 This deletion was noted in the
subsequent congressional
report on Rule502, but no objection was made to the
33
committee's decision. 1
Professor Lonnie Brown proposes one creative and sensible solution to corporations' cooperation dilemma: implementation (presumably through legislation) of
the "control group" test for corporate privilege assertions. This approach, he
argues, has a number of advantages, one of which is that
the proposed corporate attorney-client privilege will protect that about which
corporations are primarily concerned-legal advice and incriminating statements attributable to the corporation-while leaving unprotected that which is
reportedly of most interest to the government-factual information. The result
is that corporations can be deemed "cooperative" by turning over the unprotected factual materials without the necessity of waiver and
the related
1 34
concerns that accompany it-i.e ... waiver as to third parties.
Professor Brown's proposal is fairly new, but, given the high regard in which the
bar holds Upjohn and, more important, the bar's reaction to one outstanding
proposed "solution" to the lack of a selective waiver doctrine-proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 502(c)-it is fair to assume that the bar will not be rushing to
endorse this "fix." One might think that if the corporate bar truly wanted to
cooperate with the government, it would be all for proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 502(c). As the author of the proposed selective waiver provision,
Professor Daniel Capra, has explained, however, "' [t]he committee thought it was
doing corporations a favor by giving them some protection when they cooperated
with the government ....We knew we'd get grief from the plaintiffs' counsel, but

ruled that the existence of a confidentiality agreement between the disclosing party and the "adversary" agencies
to whom the work product was disclosed would not change its determination that the disclosure effected a waiver.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1430.
131. Proposed FED.R. EVID. 502(c).
132. Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on FED R. EvID. 14-16 (Apr. 12-13, 2007).
133. S. Rep. No. 110-264, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Feb. 25, 2008).
134. Brown, supra note 5, at 956.
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In 2006, an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 502 was proposed, which
stated that
in a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attomey;-client or work product protection-when made to
a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative,
or enforcement authority-does not operate as a waiver of3 1the privilege or
protection in favor of non-governmental persons or entities.1
In April 2007, after noting that this proposed revision to Rule 502 was "adamantly
opposed by bar groups and private lawyers" but "enthusiastically favored by
government offices and agencies," the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
decided to drop the provision on selective waiver. 132 This deletion was noted in the
subsequent congressional
report on Rule 502, but no objection was made to the
33
committee's decision. 1
Professor Lonnie Brown proposes one creative and sensible solution to corporations' cooperation dilemma: implementation (presumably through legislation) of
the "control group" test for corporate privilege assertions. This approach, he
argues, has a number of advantages, one of which is that
the proposed corporate attorney-client privilege will protect that about which
corporations are primarily concerned-legal advice and incriminating statements attributable to the corporation-while leaving unprotected that which is
reportedly of most interest to the government-factual information. The result
is that corporations can be deemed "cooperative" by turning over the unprotected factual materials without the necessity of waiver and
the related
134
concerns that accompany it-i.e.,.... waiver as to third parties.
Professor Brown's proposal is fairly new, but, given the high regard in which the
bar holds Upjohn and, more important, the bar's reaction to one outstanding
proposed "solution" to the lack of a selective waiver doctrine-proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 502(c)-it is fair to assume that the bar will not be rushing to
endorse this "fix." One might think that if the corporate bar truly wanted to
cooperate with the government, it would be all for proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 502(c). As the author of the proposed selective waiver provision,
Professor Daniel Capra, has explained, however, "' [t]he committee thought it was
doing corporations a favor by giving them some protection when they cooperated
with the government ....
We knew we'd get grief from the plaintiffs' counsel, but

ruled that the existence of a confidentiality agreement between the disclosing party and the "adversary" agencies
to whom the work product was disclosed would not change its determination that the disclosure effected a waiver.
Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1430.
131. Proposed FEn. R. Evm. 502(c).
132. Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on FED R. EvID. 14-16 (Apr. 12-13, 2007).
133. S.Rep. No. 110-264, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (Feb. 25, 2008).
134. Brown, supra note 5, at 956.
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documents and testing the credibility of witnesses. It may also be that prosecutors
are able to make more accurate,as well as more expeditious, decisions regarding
the appropriate allocation of individual blame or responsibility when they have the
benefits of counsel's informational and positioning advantages.
Second, and perhaps more important, is the question of access to the witnesses
themselves. It is assumed that corporate employees will speak more willinglyand more frankly-to lawyers who are "on their side" than they will to government
agents. (I will challenge this assumption in part, infra in Part V.D). Whether or not
this is true, the corporation has a "stick" with which to coerce compliance that is
not available to the government: employment consequences for those who do not
cooperate. Thus, many companies take the position that employees who assert
their Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination in internal investigations
will be disciplined, and perhaps fired.1 39 At least where the government has not
instructed the corporation to take this approach, the resulting statements are not
deemed "compelled" by state actors within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
and thus are freely usable by the government.140
Finally, as was the case in Upjohn, witnesses may be, quite literally, beyond the
reach of federal prosecutors. For example, the company may not be able to make
former employees available for interviews (and those witnesses may assert the
Fifth Amendment in response to grand jury subpoenas), meaning that the only way
the government can get their statements is through counsels' interview notes.
Many of the persons interviewed by counsel in Upjohn were not U.S. citizens and
resided in countries beyond the jurisdiction of the court; accordingly, they were not
subject to compulsory process. 14 1 It is only through the cooperation of the
company that those witnesses, or their statements, can be made available to the
government. Further, as the Upjohn magistrate found, "even if such employees
were made available for interviews, . . . it was 'not unreasonable to expect some

hesitancy, if not actual hostility, in answering questions with respect to payments

which individual took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and
responsibility may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel

may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries. Where the criminal
conduct continued over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel may
have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or retired. Accordingly, a

corporation's cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and locating relevant evidence.
McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 7.
139. See generally T.H. Waters I, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: An Examination of a "Costly"
Right to Silence for Corporate Employees in Criminal Investigations, 25 REV.LTG.603 (2006).

140. Cf United States v. Stein, 440 F Supp. 2d 315, 336-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Kaplan, J.) (finding that KPMG's
actions coerced its employees to cooperate in the investigation and were "fairly attributable" to DOJ's cooperation
policy and prosecutors' actions, and thus ruling that the employees' "coerced statements and their fruits must be
suppressed").
141. See Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 8-9. The magistrate's finding that the government had
showed the "substantial need" and "undue hardship" necessary to have access to counsel's witness statements
turned in part on the unavailability of foreign witnesses. Id.
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B. Scope of DOJ Waiver Policy in Practice
The government might have legitimate reasons for wanting access to the results
of counsel's corporate internal investigation and the information underlying their
results. But has the government been reasonable in pursuing such materials? In
assessing the corporate bar's continuing objection to privilege waiver requests, it is
helpful to outline the substance of the Filip Memo in relation to both its
precedessor, the McNulty Memo, and the proposed congressional "fix."
1. The McNulty Memo
This Memo authorized prosecutors actively to seek waivers, but cabined
prosecutorial decision-making in significant respects as compared with earlier
policy iterations. First, under the McNulty policy, before asking for a waiver,
prosecutors had to balance various policy considerations and could proceed only if
they concluded that "there [was] a legitimate need for the privileged information to
fulfill their law enforcement obligations" (not if "it [was] merely desirable or
convenient to obtain privileged information"). 143 The "important policy considerations" to be balanced in evaluating whether such a Waiver request is appropriate
were:
(1) the likelihood and degree to which the privileged information will benefit
the government's investigation; (2) whether the information sought can be
obtained in a timely and complete fashion by using alternative means that do
not require waiver; (3) the completeness of the voluntary disclosure already
1
provided; and (4) the collateral consequences to a corporation of waiver. 44

Of these, the last was a significant nod to the expressions of concern voiced by the
defense bar regarding the outsized potential consequences that may ensue in terms
of increased exposure to civil liability, in absence of a "selective waiver" rule,
should the government insist on a privilege waiver. Some in the defense community contended, however, that this first step will not represent a significant hurdle
for Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSAs) and that in many cases the line
prosecutor would conclude that she "needed" a waiver.145
The second step in the McNulty policy, then, was more important. Once
prosecutors determine to ask for a waiver, they had to "seek the least intrusive

142. Id. (citation omitted).
143. McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 8-9.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See, e.g., Ben-Veniste & De, supra note 20, at 3 ("The relatively vague balancing test to show a
'legitimate need' is easily satisfied, and it is almost guaranteed that no prosecutor would ever concede that
Category I information is sufficient to conduct a 'thorough investigation' (especially as there is no neutral arbiter
making either determination).").
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waiver necessary to conduct a complete and thorough investigation."' 146 In service
of this instruction, prosecutors were required first to consider restricting their
request to so-called "Category I" materials-described as those that contain
"purely factual information, which may or may not be privileged, relating to the
underlying conduct."' 147 Category I was said to include such materials as "copies of
key documents, witness statements, or purely factual interview memoranda
regarding the underlying misconduct, organization charts created by company
counsel, factual chronologies, factual summaries, or reports (or portions thereof)
containing investigative facts documented by counsel." 148 To request such materials, the prosecutor had to obtain the written authorization of the relevant U.S.
Attorney, who in turn had to consult with the Assistant Attorney General for
Criminal Division before saying "yea" or "nay." The waiver request had to be
communicated in writing to the corporation, and the corporation's response to this
Category I request could then "be considered in determining
whether a corporation
14 9
has cooperated in the government's investigation."
"Only if the purely factual information provide[d] an incomplete basis to
conduct a thorough investigation should prosecutors then request that the corporation provide attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work product," or so-called "Category II" materials. 150 Category II information included
"legal advice given to the corporation before, during, and after the underlying
conduct occurred." '1 51 Before requesting that a corporation turn over Category II
materials, the relevant U.S. Attorney was required to obtain the written approval of
the Deputy Attorney General; if authorized, the U.S. Attorney then had to send the
request to the company in writing. If this approval requirement did not make the
point sufficiently clear, the memo added that prosecutors were "cautioned that
Category II information should only be sought in rare circumstances" and
provided that if a corporation declines such a waiver "prosecutors may not
consider this declination against the corporation in making a charging decision"
although they could "always favorably consider a corporation's acquiescence" to
52
the request in evaluating corporate cooperation. 1
The defense bar reacted to this policy with a distinct lack of enthusiasm, 153 but
does this more explicit policy seem reasonable? Consideredonly on its own terms,
146.
147.
148.
149.

McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.

150. Id.
151. Id.

152. McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 10.
153. See, e.g., Jodi Misher Peikin & James R. Stovall, PenanceBut No Absolution: The Paradoxof Corporate
CriminalLiability, Bus. CRIMES BuLL., Jan. 2007, at 3 (arguing that the changes made in the McNulty Memo "are
a step in the right direction, but the Judiciary Committee testimony regarding the Thompson Memorandum's
effect on the right to counsel in corporate investigations highlighted problems that cannot be resolved simply by
revising the Memorandum's privilege waiver and fee-advancement provisions").
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without reference to the overall context examined in Part VI, infra, I think, so.
There is anecdotal evidence (mine and others 154 ) that prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys Offices are extremely adverse to the thought of "wasting" time and energy
securing approvals from Main Justice. The policy's Main Justice consideration
and/or approval requirements-which are quite stringent-should have deterred
an AUSA from bothering with borderline requests under DOJ policy. This, then,
should have gone a long way toward alleviating whatever concerns the defense bar
has about the frequency of these requests. The record-keeping mandates also could
have helped ensure accountability-as well as possibly resolving the empirical
disputes about the true incidence of waiver requests.
The policy coincided nicely with the long-standing divide in privilege law
between facts and the communications or work product in which they are
embedded. As the Upjohn Court stressed, the attorney-client privilege protects
qualifying communications between client and counsel, but does not privilege the
facts communicated. 155 And, on the spectrum of work product protection, "fact"
work product receives much less protection than "opinion" work product.' 5 6
Upjohn recognized that while materials that reflect the attorney's mental impressions and opinions are virtually undiscoverable, 157 materials that simply ' contain
15 8
facts can be had "upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship."
One problem presented by this policy, however, was that it is easier to talk about
"fact" versus "opinion" work product than to actually distinguish between such
animals in real life. Is a "fact chronology" that is based on witness statements and
documents, but that also obviously reflects throughout the preparing lawyer's
opinions regarding what is pertinent and what is not, "fact" or "opinion" work
product? What about witness statements that do not purport to be verbatim.
summaries, though they do not obviously include lawyers' speculations and
conclusions? "[E]ven nearly verbatim interview summaries reflect attorney work
product in the59selection of questions, the relative time and detail allotted to various
1
topics, etc."
To some extent, these potential difficulties would have fallen to case-specific
resolution. There might have been tough calls and tough negotiations. But the
policy, which is more specific than the Holder/Thompson Memo, would have been

154. See, e.g., Seide, supra note 18, at 2.
155. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Upjohn Co; v. United States, 449 U.S. 395, 398-99 (1981).
157. The Upjohn Court did not decide what standard should apply to,opinion work product, noting only that
disclosure of such "special[ly] protect[ed]" materials "is particularly disfavored," is warranted in only "rare"
situations, and has even been held to be barred in lower court decisions. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 399-401. In the
circumstances of that case, the Court held that the magistrate had clearly applied the wrong standard-that is, the
"substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship" standard applicable to fact work
product. Id. at 400.
158. Id. at 401
159. Ben-Veniste & De, supra note 20, at 3.
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easier for counsel to work around without compromising the integrity of their
investigations. For example, can counsel keep notes of witness interviews, without
fear that such notes will inevitably find their way into prosecutors' hands complete
with attorneys' credibility calls, opinions regarding the state of the witness's
recollection, reflections on how the testimony fits into the government's proposed
theory of wrongdoing, assertions regarding how the witness's statements actually
bear out the corporation's position, notes regarding future follow-up questions, and
the like? I believe that the answer is "yes"; this would be relatively easy to achieve,
although it may take the note-taking associates more time. Having written literally
thousands of witness debriefing memos during my time in private practice, I
cannot imagine that lawyers could not sanitize reports of witness interviews of all
but the faintest echoes of opinion work product. Would the statement of facts
elicited inevitably contain some element of subjectivity? Probably. But competent
lawyers could be taught to confine themselves to facts confidently asserted, and
save for another document-whose work product privilege would remain intacttheir impressions, opinions, and professional conclusions. It also strikes me that
the other items on the government's list of analytical work product are equally
"do-able" and unthreatening if counsel is disciplined.
Category 11, which encompasses those types of attorney-client advice and
opinion work product that are at the heart of the defense effort, was-under the
McNulty Memo-well nigh unattainable given approval requests. This assertion is
borne out by practice: as Deputy Attorney General Filip informed Senator Specter
on July 9, 2008, "in the eighteen months since the Principles were last amended,
the Department has approved no requests by prosecutors to obtain from corporations core attorney-client communications or non-factual attorney work product."' 16 0 The McNulty Memo provided that what would normally be Category II
information was subject only to Category I approval requirements, however,
where: (1) the corporation or one of its employees "is relying upon an advice-ofcounsel defense" (in which case legal advice contemporaneous with the underlying misconduct is relevant); or (2) the materials sought come within the crimefraud exception. 161 Although these exceptions might threaten the stringency with
which Category H materials would be treated, it is difficult to argue with them.
After all, both exceptions are already authorized by existing waiver principles,
meaning that the corporate defendants are sooner or later going to have to turn
these things over, waiver or no.
My bottom line is that this waiver policy, consideredsolely on its own terms and
without reference to the context discussedin PartVI, was as reasonable as could be
expected. It should reduce significantly the frequency of prosecutorial "requests"

160. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Mark Filip to Senator Patrick Leahy (July 9, 2008), at 2 [hereinafter

Filip Letter].
161. McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 10.
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and it should give the bar more leverage in bargaining over what will be turned
over (as well as instruction in eliminating opinion work product from that which is
produced). Wholesale abuse by line prosecutors should not be presumed; if it
eventuates, the defense bar has already amply demonstrated its-ability to pressure
DOJ into remedying its transgressions.
2. The "Attorney Client 'ProtectionAct"' and the Filip Memo
The proposed legislative "fix" to DOJ's policy raises a great many questions,
some of them foundational issues such as the constitutionality of a congressional
62
attempt to direct how the executive branch exercises its prosecutorial discretion. 1
Significantly, the bill addresses governmental conduct beyond the criminal realmincluding all civil and criminal matters-and governmental policies beyond the
attorney-client privilege issues referenced in its title. 163 In short, the defense bar
gets a great deal more in this piece of legislation than a "fix" for the "compelled"
privilege waiver policy that has been at the heart of this debate.
There are two principal featuyes of the bill that passed the House with which we
are concerned: "in any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement
matter, any agent or attorney of the United States" is barred from:
(1) demanding, requesting, or conditioning treatment "on the disclosure by an
organization, or person affiliated with that organization, of any communication
protected by the attorney-client privilege or any attorney work product"; and
(2) conditioning a civil or criminal charging decision against an organization
or affiliated individual on, or using as a factor in determining whether such
persons is cooperating with the government, "any valid assertion
of the
1 64
attorney-client privilege or privilege for attorney work product."
The bill also provides, however, that "[n]othing in this Act is intended to
prohibit an organization from making, or an agent or attorney of the United States
from accepting, a voluntary and unsolicited
offer to share the internal investigation
165
materials of such organization."
Before inquiring into how these provisions would affect DOJ policy, it may be
worthwhile to resolve a couple of ambiguities that their text raises. First, the proper

162. See, e.g., White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/2006/
week49/index.html (Dec. 9, 2006) (raising this and other issues).
163. Thus, it applies "[i]n any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter." H.R. 3013, 110th
Cong. § 3(a) (as reported by the House of Representatives, Nov. 13, 2007). It also purports to bar an "agent or
attorney of the United States" from conditioning a civil or criminal enforcement'decision on, or using as a factor
in determining the extent of cooperation, assertions of the privilege, provision of legal fees for individuals, entry
into a joint defense, sharing of defense information, or the failure to terminate employees because of their
assertion of fifth amendment rights. Id.; see also S.186, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (referred to S.Comm. on the Judiciary,
Jan. 4, 2007).
164. H.R. 3013 § 3(a); see also S.186 § 3(a).
165. H.R. 3013 § 3(a); see also S.186 § 3(a).
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reading of the initial prohibition is that it bars prosecutors from requesting or
conditioning treatment on waivers; although the provision could perhaps be read to
bar prosecutors from asking for anything-including facts imbedded in protected
communications or work product-that, with or without the prosecutor's knowledge, ends up being subject to some privilege claim, this reading would seem not
only counterproductive but also nonsensical.
Another question is whether the bill bars any governmental consideration of
waiver decisions. The emphasis in the second prohibition on the "valid assertion of
the attorney-client privilege or privilege for attorney work product" suggests that
assertions cannot be considered as a negative but perhaps waivers can be as a
positive in the corporation's favor. It would also be odd to read the Act as stating
that an entity's willingness to turn over investigative materials that are also
privileged can never figure in any governmental decision because the bill makes
clear that it does not affect "voluntary disclosures" of internal investigative
materials. In such circumstances, then, one would assume that the bill does not
purport to prevent prosecutors from considering such voluntary disclosures as a
factor in the corporation'sfavor-only valid assertions of privilege as a negative
consideration. The text of the bill appears to require this result, but this reading is
subject to some question. First, the House Judiciary Committee's report on the
"Attorney Client Protection Act of 2007" states that "[t]here should be no
differentials in an assessment of cooperation (i.e., neither a credit nor a penalty)
based upon whether or not the materials disclosed are protected by attorney-client
privilege or attorney work product." 166 Second, one might ask whether this result
is truly possible as a conceptual matter-that is, if one gives credit for waivers,
isn't a failure to get a credit for a waiver actually a penalty for asserting it?
Having attempted to clarify the import of the bill, the next question is how it
would affect DOJ policy. The legislation would, of course, have eviscerated the
McNulty Memo. First, it would prevent the government for asking for any
waivers-without distinguishing between Category I or Category II materials.
Second, it would bar DOJ from considering refusals to waive, again making no
distinction (as does the McNulty Memo) between Category I and II. All of the
McNulty Memo's directions regarding the circumstances in which waiver requests
are appropriate, and all the approval and recordkeeping requirements, would have
been rendered obsolete. The only part of the policy that would have remained was
the recognition that corporations could volunteer to waive and presumably could
be rewarded in charging determinations for that decision.
What of the Filip Memo-does the revised policy address the concerns to which
the bill is responsive? Deputy Attorney General Filip, appearing before Congress
in July 2008, summarized the important changes he proposed to make in his
rewriting of the corporate charging policy as follows:

166. H.R. Rep. No. 110-445, at 4 (2007) (emphasis added).
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Cooperation will be measured by the extent to which a corporation discloses
relevant facts and evidence, not its waiver of privileges. The government's key
measure of cooperation will be the same for a corporation as for an individual:
to what extent has the corporation timely disclosed the relevant facts about the
misconduct? That will be the operative question-not whether the corporation
waived attorney-client privilege or work product protection in making its
disclosures.
Federal prosecutors will not demand the disclosure of "Category II" information as a condition for cooperation credit. To be eligible for cooperation credit,
a corporation need not disclose, and the government may not demand, what the
McNulty Memo defines as "Category II information"-namely, non-factual
attorney work product and core attorney-client privileged communications.
(Of course, attorney-client communications that were made in furtherance of a
crime or fraud, or that relate to an advise-of-counsel defense, are excluded
well-settled case law and will therefore
from the protection of the privilege by 167
continue to fall outside the principles.)
In short, it seems that the DOJ attempted to split the baby: it agreed to foreswear
considering waiver decisions, per se, in its cooperation and charging determinations, but did not agree to forgo requestingwaivers in some circumstances.
First, AUSAs are barred from considering corporate waiver determinations in
evaluating cooperation or making judgments about charging. The Filip Memo
states that cooperation will be measured by the information surrendered, not by the
waivers provided. 168 Is this an important development? The amount of information
(not the existence, per se, of a waiver) should have been the metric all along. For
example, the earliest iteration of the policy, put forth in the Holder Memo, made
clear that, in "assessing the adequacy of a corporation's cooperation," the "completeness of its disclosure" was key-and that could but did not have to include
privilege waivers. Although this change appears to be directly responsive to the
threatened legislation, it also appears to go beyond the bill's text-potentially to
the disadvantage of corporate targets. Thus, although the text of the bill implies
that volunteered waivers can be considered in the "plus column" for corporations
in making cooperation and charging determinations, DOJ policy quotes the House
Report and makes it clear that waiver decisions should be irrelevant for all
69
purposes. 1
Second, and notably in light of the threatened statutory provisions, the DOJ does
not say that it will not request any privilege waivers. Congress did not choose to
distinguish between so-called "Category I" and "Category II" materials in its
legislative bar on prosecutorial waiver solicitations, but DOJ attempts to maintain
its consistent distinction-laid out most explicitly in the McNulty Memo--

167. Filip Letter, supra note 160, at 2.
168. Id.; see Filip Memo, supra note 3, at 9.
169. See Filip Memo, supranote 3, at 10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 110-445 at 4 (2007)).
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between "factual" and "core" work product and privileged communications. 171
Thus, prosecutors can ask for waiver of Category I materials-apparently without
the explicit guidelines, record-keeping, and approval requirements set forth in the
McNulty Memo. Prosecutors are barred from asking for Category II materials "as
a condition for the corporation's eligibility to receive cooperation credit" (and
subject to the advice-of-counsel-defense and crime-fraud exceptions articulated in
the McNulty Memo).1 7 ' Again, the procedural safeguards of the McNulty Memo
are not reflected in the new policy with respect to Category II materials.
In sum, DOJ is still fighting Congress for the right to ask for Category I
materials, and (apparently) to ask for Category II where that waiver is not a
condition for cooperation credit. The next question must be: why-what valid
needs are served by these exemptions? Those of us outside DOJ can only guess in
this respect, but my speculations lead me to believe that. the first reservation is
more legitimate than the second. DOJ's original policy valued waivers--quite
apart from the facts revealed through such waivers-as helpful in that they
"expedite[d] its investigation" and assisted prosecutors in "evaluat[ing] the accuracy and completeness of the company's voluntary disclosure."' ' 72 I assume that
DOJ's continuing assertion of a right to ask for Category I materials stems from
similarly practical considerations. For example, if the actual "Category I" fact
summaries, chronologies, and (non-opinion-laden) witness statements generated
by counsel contemporaneous with the internal investigation are not turned over
through waiver, just how are the facts embedded in these materials to be
communicated to the prosecutor? Will counsel pick and choose facts from these
materials to be, after the fact, turned over in a new piece of work product? If so,
will this document-which may well have the feel of an advocacy piece rather
than a'summary of facts or statements-be as effective for the prosecution's
purposes? Will it permit prosecutors-as does a waiver-to obtain what it needs
quickly and efficiently or will the "facts" to be turned over have to be negotiated?
Ultimately, how will prosecutors be able to assess whether all the "facts" they need
have been provided?
DOJ's reservation with respect to Category II materials is both less justified and
ultimately less important. It is not clear what might be a legitimate request in this
regard-that is, when will Category II materials not be requested "as a condition
for cooperation credit"? Reserving the right to ask for Category II materials in
order to "double-check" that the corporation has "told all" by asking for counsel's
opinion work product is much more questionable than a similar effort to check the
completeness of'factual productions. Defense counsel's job at this point is a

170. See Filip Memo, supra note 3, at 11 ("Communications [with corporate counsel], which are both
independent of the fact-gathering component of an internal investigation and made for the purpose of seeking or
dispensing legal advice, lie at the core of the attorney-client privilege.").
171. Id. at 12.
172. McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at 8.
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difficult one. To paraphrase one expert white-collar defense lawyer, one wants to
situate one's client on either. side of the road-either fighting like hell or
cooperating fully. Trying to navigate the middle of the road-that is, appearing to
cooperate but resisting in reality-is an invitation to be run over.1 7 3 Nonetheless,
counsel's job, even should the client elect to cooperate fully, is never wholly that of
a deputy of the government. Throughout, counsel will be subtly advocating,
"spinning" the facts, trying to ensure that the client gets the best possible deal (and
that the deal sticks). It hard to conceive of why the government should be entitled
to rifle through counsel's files to see what counsel believes might be the "worst
case" scenarios for the client or otherwise to delve into the particulars of counsel's
delicate advocacy. Finally, whatever the scope or purpose of this exemption,
2006 indicates that this is not a much-used waiver category in
experience since
74
actual fact.'
What value, then, is there in Congress pressing for a full bar on any requests for
waivers? Presumably defense counsel believe that in the absence of such a bar,
prosecutors will continue to request at least Category I waivers in every case. The
procedural hurdles the McNulty Memo put in place-with respect to documentation and approval requirements-would have addressed this concern. Defense
lawyers may also be concerned that prosecutors whose requests for waiver are
respectfully declined will-consciously or not-continue secretly to factor this in
to their evaluation of corporate cooperation, regardless of the bar on such
consideration in the Filip policy.
In considering whether this last objection has validity, one must ask whether an
additional, statutory bar will be effective in removing waiver issues entirely from
prosecutorial decision-making. One of the defense's most frequent objections to
the McNulty policy is relevant to this question. The procedural hurdles for both
Category I and Category II were not, under the terms of that policy, applicable
where the corporation "voluntarily" offered privileged documents "without a
request by the government" (although records of such "voluntary" waivers had to
be maintained by the U.S. Attorney).1 7 5 A number of practitioners pointed to this
exception as one that could well have swallowed all the other rules and approval
requirements. Richard Ben-Veniste and Raj De, for example, argued that it was
"inevitable that a new kabuki dance will be born-between prosecutors seeking
privileged material but wanting to avoid the hassle of the McNulty Memo's
authorization hurdles on the one hand, and corporations seeking to curry favor
with the prosecutors ...by 'voluntarily' producing such material in an effort to
seem accommodating" on the other.1 7 6 "As a practical matter, what board of

173. Thanks to Scott Muller.
174. See supra text accompanying note 160 (in eighteen months of operation, no requests for Category H
waivers). "
175. McNulty Memo, supra note 3, at11.
176. Ben-Veniste & De, supra note 20, at 3.
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directors will opt to take a principled stand opposing waiver when a 'voluntary'
' 177
waiver may be the determinative factor in the prosecutor's charging decision?"
It seems exceedingly likely that were a complete bar on waiver "requests" to be
adopted by statute, the same "kabuki" dynamic would be created given that the
proposed legislation expressly states that its provisions do not affect "voluntary"
waivers of protected materials. How can this "kabuki" be avoided-by barring any
discussion of waivers? Barring corporations from ever "volunteering" to waive?
That either course would not be in the best interests of the clients is illustrated by
the further question of why defense counsel ever recommend that their clients
accede to government privilege waiver "requests" if such waivers are indeed likely
to have so adverse an affect on corporate interests.
As Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty noted in his congressional
testimony,
What is not often discussed in this debate is that a privilege waiver is often
volunteered or agreed to by a company for specific, business reasons. When a
criminal investigation is launched, receipt of subpoenas must be publicly
reported, stock prices fall, and the company undergoes the protracted and
disruptive process of responding to multiple document subpoenas and providing employees to the government for interviews and grand jury testimony. At
the same time, the company's lawyers are conducting their internal investigation or have already completed it. If the company decides to cooperate, it can
face additional delay while the government duplicates the company's efforts in
collecting documents and interviewing witnesses, or it may choose to waive
privilege and offer the results of its internal investigation so that the government moves faster. The choice to waive often allows the government to make a
charging decision within months rather than years, and saves
178 the company
money and employee time and protects the value of its stock.
The answer, then, is that counsel are required to serve the interests of this client in
this case, and that often means waiving, regardless of what effect that individual
waiver will have on the next case, and the next, and the next. Individual corporate
waivers may cumulatively have unfortunate systemic consequences, but it would
be .a grave disservice to corporate clients to bar them from doing that which may
most certainly be in their best interests.
If waivers cannot be barred consistent with the best interests of those the
legislation seeks to protect, what is the best course of action? A legislative bar that
basically pushes all waiver negotiations underground, promoting "kabuki" in
every case, is certainly not optimal. The McNulty approach strikes the most
promising balance. It permits some waiver requests, and thus means some of the
177. Id. at 3-4.
178. The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 116 (2006) (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.
of the United States).
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kabuki is avoided. By making requests subject to explicit requirements that
prosecutors explicitly justify their choices, choose the least intrusive approach,
seek approval at senior levels of the Department, and keep records that ensure
accountability, abusive practices can be avoided or at least policed-something not
possible where the entire dance takes place off the record. And what kabuki
remains is still subject to review; prosecutors under the McNulty policy were
required to keep records even of "volunteered" waivers. Thus, if this "kabuki
dance" became common, the defense could do what it has for years: complain
-loudly and vigorously, up and down the DOJ chain of command and elsewhere,
about misuse of waiver policies-this time with DOJ's own records as proof.
A legislative fix, then,-is not the answer measured in substance. If one could
graft the substantive changes wrought in the Filip Memo onto the procedural bones
of the McNulty policy, what we would have is an approach responsive to
legitimate prosecutorial and defense concerns. Moreover, there is a real question
about the efficacy of a legislation solution. It is unclear how (if at all) the bill's
provisions are enforceable, and at whose instance, and what remedies might
appropriately be applied. If courts are inclined to hold hearings into prosecutorial
investigative practices and charging decisions based on this statute, it would be a
huge departure from the current near-total judicial reluctance to get into
such
179
grounds.
competency
judicial
or
separation-of-powers
on
usually
matters,
V.

UPJOHN REVISITED

The defense bar has already shown a disinclination to adopt my optimistic view
of DOJ policy and certainly disagrees about the efficacy of the Attorney Client
Protection. 1 80Accordingly, we must return to the basics: that is, to the fundamental
question whether the corporate attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
are necessary given the policy imperatives underlying these protections.
A. Will the CorporationCease Seeking Legal Advice Absent Privilege
Protections?
The question whether the protections of the attorney-client privilege and the

179. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
180. There is also disagreement over the empirical fall-out of the changes in DOJ policy. Compare, e.g.,
Examining Approaches to CorporateFraudProsecutionsand the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the McNulty
Memorandum: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6-7 (Sept. 18, 2007) (statement of
Karin Immergut) (noting that between the implementation of the McNulty Memo in December 2006 and the date
of her testimony on September 18, 2007, the Criminal Division received ten requests for factual information
under Category 1, only five of which involved a request for privileged documents actually covered by the
Memorandum, and four of the five requests were approved; noting further that the Office of the Deputy Attorney
General has not processed any requests for Category 11information), with Letter from E. Norman Veasey to Hon.
Patrick Leahy & Hon. Arlen Specter (Sept. 13, 2007) (summarizing, as a "neutral" asked to do so by the ACC and
the NACDL, anonymous reports of abuses, but noting that no independent verification of the facts alleged was
attempted).
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work product doctrine are necessary to ensure that corporations consult with legal
counsel for purposes of legal compliance does not require a great deal of thought.
At the outset, one must put the forced-waiver question in context. The attorneyclient privilege, and the work product doctrine, are "evidentiary in nature,
protecting against the compelled disclosure by the attorney or client of communications between them that satisfy the requisite elements."1 8 1 But lawyers also have
an ethical duty to
guard the confidences of their clients, and this duty is unaffected
182
policy:
by DOJ
The chief difference between the professional duty of confidentiality and the
evidentiary attorney-client privilege is that the former applies to virtually all
information coming into a lawyer's hands concerning a client, and forbids
virtually all disclosures, whereas the latter only applies when the question is
whether a lawyer can183
be compelled to testify about her professional communications with a client.

In short, "the professional duty of confidentiality remains a central part of the
lawyer's ethical obligations, and continues to encompass far
more, and to be far
1 84
more broadly applicable, than the attorney-client privilege."
Given that the duty of confidentiality provides security in the general day-to-day
conduct of corporate business, I assume that most corporate actors will continuedespite DOJ policy-to feel comfortable seeking legal advice. Even if those
contemplating seeking legal advice on close questions have, in the backs of their
minds, the possibility that (1) litigation may eventually ensue from a particular
decision, (2) a privilege waiver may be requested and granted, and (3) they or the
corporation will be in trouble in the event the advice eventually sought is
disregarded or wrong, a wealth of "[i]ndependent legal and economic incentives
exist that may inspire corporations to strive for legal compliance irrespective of the
prospect of privilege waiver." 18 5 Even the Upjohn Court seems to have conceded
this point,18 6 so we shall press on to Professor Brown's "parade of horribles."
B. Will Counsel Stop Investigating?
Only a slightly more credible concern is that which was central to the argument

181. Brown, supra note 5, at 908.
182. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.6 (2004).
183. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WnI.Am HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERINO § 9.7 (3d ed. 2001) (emphasis

original).
184. Horton, supra note 116, at 101-02.
185. Brown, supra note 5, at 903, 923-24; See also LUBAN, supra note 44, at 887; Duggin, supra note 44, at
887; Sexton, supranote 44, at 464; Hamilton, supra note 44, at 648.
186. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 387, 392 ("In light of the vast and complicated array of
regulatory legislation confronting the modem corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go
to lawyers to find out how to obey the law."') (quoting Bryson P Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
CorporateArena, 24 Bus. LAw. 901,913 (1969)).
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in Upjohn: whether lawyers and clients will simply cease to conduct internal
investigations when allegations of wrongdoing arise. To respond to this concern,
one must consider why corporations do feel obligated-despiteDOJpolicy and
the lack of a selective waiver doctrine-tocontinue undertaking internal investigations. The answer is that the waiver issue is only one consideration in the complex
of factors. And as white-collar defenders conclude when they are writing not about
the horrors of DOJ waiver policy but instead about the whys and wherefores of
internal corporate investigations, this complex of factors in the usual case will
demand investigation of alleged wrongdoing even with the possibility or even
certainty of an eventual waiver. There appears to be no evidence that-despite
DOJ policy and the lack of a selective waiver doctrine--corporations have
declined to conduct investigations where they otherwise would; and, as Professor
Dan Richman notes, "should existing incentives be insufficient in this regard,
policymakers
could increase them, particularly on the civil or criminal sanctioning
7
, 18

side."

At the most general level, companies need to know the facts in order to defend
themselves. As Nancy Kestenbaum summarizes:
Companies ...reap numerous affirmative benefits by conducting their own
investigations. Even if the government is not investigating a company, a
company that conducts an internal investigation on its own gains the advantage
of knowing what the facts are, and, if there is no legal requirement that such
investigation be disclosed, can then take appropriate internal action and then
decide whether or not to bring such results to the government's attention ....
[O]ccasionally the company can persuade the government not to investigate at
all or to narrow the issues under investigation. Even if the government does
investigate, a company that has conducted its own investigation is armed with
the facts, can make informed decisions, can take appropriate remedial action
and can better craft defenses-all of which will leave the company betterpositioned to deal with the government, whether or not the government
expressly gives
the company cooperation credit for conducting its own
1 88
investigation.
Beyond these general considerations, a variety of external circumstances make
internal investigations wise (or imperative), some of which existed at the time
Upjohn was decided but many of which have developed since that date.
The most obvious reason to conduct an internal investigation into alleged
wrongdoing is that such investigations are required, in some instances, by statute,
such as the Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986,189 the Medicare Fraud

187. Richman, supra note 5,at 311; see also Comey Remarks, supra note 14, at 2 ("We have seen no evidence
at all that corporations refrain from conducting internal investigations because, in order to obtain leniency for
cooperating, they might be asked to waive a privilege.").
188. Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 103, at 151-52.
189. 41 U.S.C. § 57 (2000).
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Reporting Act, 1' 9 and federal banking regulations.1 9' These statutes and other
regulations were put in place only after Upjohn. For example, after Upjohn,
industry regulators and associations, such as the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, put
into place rules that "require ongoing investigation and/or disclosure in situations
involving suspicious circumstances or allegations of wrongdoing ....,192
Another obvious reason to investigate is to ensure that whatever wrongdoing
has gone on has ceased. Especially where DOJ, regulators, or others have raised
questions about the allegations, letting the conduct continue is an invitation for
harsh sanctions. Even where the allegations come from within the organization-in the form of anonymous reports or questions from internal auditors or
others-the corporation is risking a great deal if it determines to play ostrich,
betting on its ability to contain the allegations. Marcu suggests that the
very human and understandable reluctance to look for trouble... is likely to be

regarded by prosecutors in today's overly crime-conscious environment as
indifference to or even tacit approval of wrongdoing. With scandals like Enron
and WorldCom still fresh in the public memory and new stories about
companies under investigation breaking every day, corporate executives do not
1 93
have the luxury of hoping it goes away when the hint of criminality appears.
Finally, even if the conduct itself has ceased, the organization must recognize that,
unless it takes prompt remedial action, the wrongdoing may morph into other legal
problems. For example, in Upjohn, the IRS was investigating in part to determine
whether Upjohn improperly treated the "questionable payments" (i.e., bribes) as
deductible business expenses. 194 Assuming that the criminal activity is reflected in
the bottom line, that bottom line may need to be restated or future accounting
based on the earlier numbers may itself be misleading, and criminally actionable.
Business or regulatory considerations are often cited as critical to decisions to
investigate allegations of wrongdoing. Especially today, in light of enforcement
emphasis on combating corporate depredations and general public unease given
global financial turmoil, investigations may be necessary to reassure various
corporate stakeholders-including investors, employees, clients or customers,
auditors, regulators and the like. 195 A somewhat related-and very importantadvantage of investigation is that it permits companies to meet whatever reporting
requirements constrain them under state or federal law. For example, the Upjohn
investigation was prompted not only by a desire to take advantage of a SEC

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

42 U.S.C. § 1320-a7(b) (2000).
See, e.g., 12 C.FR. § 21.11 (2007).
Duggin, supra note 44, at 885-86.
Marcu, supra note 103, at 202; see also Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 103, at 151.
See Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 23 n.15.
See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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voluntary disclosure policy that would have mitigated any criminal or civil
sanctions from the wrongdoing, but also to meet Upjohn's obligations under SEC
regulations controlling the disclosure requirements for publicly-traded companies.
Among the most compelling reasons to initiate internal investigations are those
arising from increased federal interest in pursuing corporations civilly and criminally, the sentencing regime for organizations created by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, and the proliferation of compliance programs in part responsive to
these circumstances. 196 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that control the sentencing of organizations for most federal criminal violations (the "organizational
guidelines") became effective on November 1, 1991.197 One manifestation of the
organizational guidelines' underlying "carrot and stick" philosophy-which has as
its object galvanizing organizational efforts to prevent organizational wrongdoing-is an important sentencing credit that organizations can claim for having in
place an "effective program to prevent and detect violations of law." This "carrot"
is critical in many corporate crime cases because of the potentially harsh restitution, fine, and corporate probation requirements that constitute the guidelines'
"stick."
The organizational guidelines have been commonly credited with creating a
boom in organizational compliance efforts. As a consequence, a consulting
industry has been created and significant organizational attention-in a wide
variety of industries and businesses-has been devoted to determining how best to
structure and maintain effective compliance programs. The organizational guidelines also undoubtedly focused prosecutorial and regulatory attention on the
subject. The guidelines provided governmental actors with a template upon which
to build on when formulating their own policies regarding what constitutes an
"effective program" for purposes of making decisions regarding the appropriate
imposition of civil and criminal penalties. Finally, the organizational guidelines
influenced corporate law, spurring most notably the Delaware Chancery Court, in
In re Caremark, to authorize judicial scrutiny of directors' duties vis-ii-vis
compliance.

198

196. See, e.g., Duggin, supra note 44, at 868-85.
197. U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINts MANuAL ch. 8 (1992). In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the statutes
that made the guidelines mandatory violated individual defendants' Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether corporations have a jury
trial right, so one could argue that the organizational guidelines should continue to bind sentencing judges. For a
discussion of this question and the law relevant to it, see Timothy A. Johnson, Note, Sentencing Organizations

After Booker, 116 YALE L.J. 632 (2006). Whether or not the organizational guidelines are formally binding, courts
are generally adhering to the "advisory" guidelines regime in sentencing, even post-Booker, and where they are
not, it is generally at the government's request. See, e.g., ACC 2006 STuDY RESULTS, supra note 3, at 36.
198. See In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). In Caremark,the
Delaware Chancery Court was asked to approve the settlement of a shareholder derivative action alleging that the
Caremark directors had breached their duty of care by failing to supervise the conduct of Caremark's employees.
The court approved the settlement, but in so doing raised the question "what is the board's responsibility with
respect to the organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the corporation functions within the law
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Compliance programs of the sort contemplated by the guidelines require that

organizations faced with allegations of wrongdoing conduct some sort of internal
investigation, stop the conduct, and remedy its effects. Other regulators such as the
SEC and the New York Stock Exchange have, building on the guidelines model,
issued policies stating that regulatory action will turn in part on the quality of
companies' investigations of alleged malfeasance.1 99 What does all this mean?

Because compliance programs generally require the initiation of an internal
investigation when allegations of wrongdoing surface, -such investigations are
embedded in many corporations' standard operating procedures; the question is
not whether to investigate, but what the scope of the investigation should be and
who ought to conduct it. If a company deviates from its own compliance program
and foregoes an investigation in such a situation, that itself is a huge red flag that

can invite investigation.
Another reason for conducting an investigation is that such a practice generally
works if the object is to avoid criminal sanction and minimize regulatory exposure.
One informal study of available data on the effect of the conduct of an internal
investigation on the government concluded:
[T]he evidence shows a clear correlation between a specific reference by DOJ
or the SEC to a company's internal investigation and a more favorable
conclusion to a government investigation for the company .... [Further, t]here
are presumably numerous cases-and we are aware of many from our own
practice-in which, without any public mention, the government has given a
company substantial credit for conducting an internal investigation and the

to achieve its purposes?" Id. at 968-69. The Chancery Court stated that "[m]odernly this question has been given
special importance by an increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the criminal law to assure
corporate compliance with external legal requirements" and by the organizational guidelines, "which impact
importantly on the prospective effect these criminal sanctions might have on business corporations." Id. at 969.
The guidelines "offer powerful incentives for corporations today to have in place compliance programs to detect
violations of law, promptly to report violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take
prompt, voluntary remedial efforts." Id. The court concluded:
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to
do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses caused by
non-compliance with applicable legal standards.
Id. at 970. The Chancery Court's remarks in Caremark have raised the prospect-however attenuated-of
directors' derivative liability for others' failures to ensure that adequate compliance programs are in place.
Consequently, the Caremark decision, which was significantly influenced by the Organizational Guidelines,
"gave the movement toward corporate self-policing-known as compliance planning-a kick in the pants." John
Gibeaut, Getting Your House in Order,85 A.B.A. J. 65, 66 (1999).
199. With respect to the SEC, see the SEC charging documents cited supra note 3. With respect to other
regulators, see, for example, Memorandum from the New York Stock Exchange to All Members, Member
Organizations and Chief Operating Officers, No. 05-65 (Sept. 14, 2005), availableat http://overregd.lingquist.con/
archives/NYSE%20Information%20Memo%205-65.pdf.
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not to
investigation played a significant role in the government's willingness
2
charge the company or to settle a case on more favorable terms. 00

Finally, and unavoidably, there are the personal and professional imperatives
faced by high-ranking individuals within the corporation. In reaction to the
potential "risks posed by the criminalization of business conduct, and largely
spurred by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, public corporations-and
their Audit Committees-find themselves increasingly relying on internal investigations as both a way to ferret out potential wrongdoing and to insulate themselves
and their directors and officers from liability.,20 1 Indeed, many Board membersparticularly the "independent" directors-may conclude that:
[T]he decision as to whether an internal investigation should be conducted is
not really a discretionary one. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, Audit Committees and
company management are required to address whistleblower complaints and
other indicia of potential wrongdoing or face liability. Similarly, under Delato address "red flags" may be
ware and other states' corporate law, a failure
202
found to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.

Curious as to whether my educated guessing was supported by practical
experience, I reviewed a random sampling of practitioners' recent writings on the
subject of internal corporate investigations.2 0 3 The results were strikingly consistent with the above conclusions. 2° In the words of one lawyer: "when evidence of
possible employee wrongdoing comes to management's attention, there really is
no choice any more" because "[mianagement's early and aggressive investigation

200. Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 103, at 151; see also Andrew C. Hruska, What's Really Going On in
CorporateChargingDecisions?, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 2005, col. 4:
[A]n analysis of the Justice Department's corporate charging decisions over the past three years
demonstrates that a different dynamic is at work ....[I]ncreasingly often, companies that
cooperate with government investigators have successfully minimized the damage even from
significant criminal conduct by senior managers. In a few cases, the benefits of superlative
cooperation have been so substantial as to avoid conviction even when companies initially
obstructed government investigations.
201. Sarkozi, supra note 103, at 97 (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 99.
203. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 103.
204. Some more cynical, colleagues have suggested that financial self-interest might motivate this advice. I
take comfort from the fact that the practitioners' literature generally does not treat the question as a "no-brainer"
and instead acknowledges that internal investigations are not without cost. For example, investigations may
uncover additional criminality that may not otherwise have surfaced, and they can increase the likelihood that
negative information will reach the ears of the government or become publicly available. As discussed above, the
possibility exists that the government will "request" a privilege waiver and that, if such a "request" is accepted,
the results of the investigation will also have to be provided to others seeking to exact civil damages. Internal
investigations can also be expensive and disruptive to business operations; they distract management and may
create serious morale problems. Finally, investigations may compel organizations to change remunerative
business practices, terminate business relationships, or fire otherwise productive and valued employees. See
generally sources cited supra note 103.
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of such a problem is the company's best chance of maximizing control over what
otherwise could become an unmanageable situation and minimizing the risk of
both criminal exposure and public scandal. 2 °5
C. Will the Quality of CorporateInvestigations Suffer Because of DOJ Policy?
The defense bar argues that a second "horrible" results from a lack of protection
for attorney work product in internal investigations: "lawyers' internal investigations will become 'paperless'-counsel will refrain from taking notes or preparing
memoranda in connection with corporate representations to avoid future provision
of a blueprint for culpability to regulators and perhaps third parties. 20 6 This, of
course, relates to the rationale underlying the work product doctrine, which
assumes that if lawyers cannot maintain the privacy of their work product, they
simply will not record their thoughts rather than provide the results of their
investigation and their strategizing to the adversary. If this dynamic indeed existed
in this context, it would be a serious problem because an internal investigation of
any seriousness requires papering. Counsel will talk to dozens of witnesses (or
more), review reams of records (including accounting or other financial materials),
and try to integrate all the facts and figures learned by various lawyers into some
kind of comprehensive whole. It is simply impossible to do this effectively, much
less efficiently, without generating significant written work product.
Could counsel be arguing that their duty of effective representation requires
them to compromise the investigation? I must be missing something, because it
sounds very much to me like an argument that a lawyer's ethical duty to the entity
requires-in light of the possibility of prospective privilege waiver requests-that
lawyers commit malpractice while investigating. I believe it appropriate at this
juncture to adopt the sanguine view expressed by the Solicitor General in Upjohn:
that this argument does a disservice to the professionalism of counsel 20 7 and is,
ultimately, (paraphrasing here) just plain silly.
When the bar is not objecting to the compelled-voluntary waiver policy but

205. Marcu, supra note 103, at 203; see also, e.g., Thomas & Stead, supra note 103 ("In the current
environment, a corporation presented with credible evidence of wrongdoing is expected to conduct a thorough
internal investigation and cooperate willingly with any external investigation."); Kestenbaum & Criss noted:
In the current enforcement environment, conducting an internal investigation is clearly the safer
response to an indication of wrongful conduct by an employee. Investigating will not only leave
the company in the best position to deal with the government, but the evidence is now clear that it
also can help the company gain significant benefits from the federal government for having done
SO.
Supra note 103, at 152.
206. Brown, supra note 5, at 901.
207. See supra text accompanying note 75; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 942 (noting that a "lawyer's
ethical duty of competency combined with a fear of malpractice liability or the possibility that some other civil or
criminal action will be instituted against [corporate counsel] seem to provide ample motivation for careful
documentation and record-keeping" in an internal corporate investigation).
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rather is lending general advice on the effective conduct of internal corporate
investigations, it is able to call malpractice malpractice. As noted above, whitecollar lawyers consistently emphasize that an internal investigation must be
thorough and credible to be of any assistance to the corporation, either in
evaluating its position or in the course of cooperation with the government. Indeed,
far from cautioning counsel to stop taking notes of potentially inculpatory
statements made in witness interviews, some practitioners stress that such material
must be included in thefinal reportbecause a "balanced report is more informative
to the company officials who must act on" it and a "report that includes both
exculpatory and incriminating evidence is fair to the individuals and entities that
may be criticized in the report." 2 8 Most importantly, "[i]f the company decides to
disclose the report to the Government, a report that presents the incriminating
evidence as well as the exculpatory evidence is more likely to be credited by law
enforcement officials; government officials are likely to discount a report that
ignores incriminating evidence." 2° Indeed, a poorly executed investigation, or a
biased, selective report, is worse than no report at all because the government2 10
is
likely to view it, at best, as a whitewash or an attempt to protect management
and, at worst, as obstruction. The latter possibility is to be avoided at all costs, of
course, given the government's penchant of late for applying the criminal obstruction statutes in this context.21 In short, if it is in the client's best interest to do an
investigation, it is also in the client's interest that it be done thoroughly, fairly, and
well.
Finally, the compelled-voluntary waiver policy of DOJ and other federal
regulators is not the greatest threat to the sanctity of corporate privileges in this
context. As the Supreme Court explained in Upjohn Co. v. United States, "[a]n
uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."' 2 12 If, as
the bar seems to argue, any prospective uncertainty in the viability of the privilege
in an internal investigation' compromises the quality of such investigations, then
these investigations must already be shoddy beyond redemption.
Rather than cataloguing all the generally-applicable exemptions or waiver
doctrines (such as the crime-fraud exception, the reliance-on-counsel-defense,

208. Winer et al., supra note 103, at 334.

209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Finnegan, supra note 103, at 927 (noting that it "is paramount that counsel conducting the
internal investigation solely represent the interests of the corporate entity and not any individual employee,
officer, or Board member .... Failure to do this will undermine the credibility of the investigation and put the

corporation at serious risk").
211. See, e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, DOJ Risks Killing the Golden Goose Through Computer Associates!
Singleton Theories of Obstruction, 44 AM. CRam. L. REv. 1447 (2007) [hereinafter O'Sullivan, Golden Goose];
Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" is a Disgrace:Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CamM.
L. & CRnmiwouOGy 643, 677 (2006) [hereinafter O'Sullivan, Code as Disgrace].

212. Upjohn, Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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exceptions to privilege protections in shareholder derivative litigation, partial and
inadvertent disclosure waiver rules, waivers by new management, and the rules
permitting attorneys to void the privilege in self-defense2 1 3), let us simply note a
few common threats to the certainty of privilege protection in this particular
context for which our discussion has already laid the foundation:
(1) Some investigations may have been conducted both to assist in contemplated
litigation with the government and to serve business interests, such as persuading
regulators, customers, suppliers, competitors, or the general public that the
wrongdoing was the act of a rogue employee and that the corporation is acting
diligently to prevent future occurrences of misconduct. Where an investigation is
launched both in anticipation of business needs and possible litigation, the work
product privilege may not attach unless the corporation (as proponent of the
privilege) can make a record that the internal investigation would not have
happened "but for" anticipated litigation.214
(2) Relatedly, waivers occur when the results of internal investigations into
corporate wrongdoing are revealed to others for imperative business reasons.
These may not feel to corporations and their counsel like "voluntary" waivers, but
privileged materials are fair game to the government and others once revealed to
independent auditors verifying the company's financial statements,2 15 counsel for
underwriters,2 16 government contract performance auditors,2 17 and government
regulators, either to secure approval of a proposed corporate action 21 8 or to avert
regulatory enforcement action. 219 Given the frequent incidence of these cases, it
appears that the possibility that business concerns will prompt a waiver may
approach that of a DOJ "request" under the cooperation policy.
(3) As is sensible, corporate counsel faced with investigating allegations of
wrong-doing within a corporation attempt to shield their investigative interviews,
results, and advice by modeling their investigations on Upjohn. What the literature
seems to ignore, however, is that much of the information protected from federal
regulators and prosecutors by Upjohn is not consistently protected under either
U.S. state or foreign law. Counsel, then, will hope for the application of the Upjohn
subject-matter test, but cannot rely on that protection.

213. For the content of these rules, see JuLE R. O'SuLLIvAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIE (3d ed. 2007), at
98 (good faith reliance on counsel defense and waiver consequences), 952-56 (inadvertent waiver rules), 969-77
(crime-fraud exception), 977-83 (governmental actors).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998). The Fifth Circuit employs a more
rigorous standard, holding that litigation must be "the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the
document." United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).
215. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d

530, 539-42 (5th Cir.1982).
216. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 488-89.
217. See, e.g., United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681,683 (1st Cir.1997).
218. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C. Cir.1981).
219. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1417-18 (3d Cir.1991); In re
Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369-75 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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A good number of U.S. states have not adopted the Upjohn standard to test the
scope of the attorney-client privilege. Indeed, although many appear to have
endorsed no standard at all, a number have endorsed the "control group" test that
Upjohn rejected.22 ° Obviously, "[t]he lack of uniformity between states in this
regard poses a major problem for national corporations with presences in various
jurisdictions." 221 In particular, corporations that conduct internal investigations
may not, at least in state litigation, count on the application of the broad
protections of the Upjohn "subject-matter"-like test. Wise counsel will assume that
the most restrictive test-the "control group" test-is the only one that a corporation which operates in a number of states may safely rely upon.22 2 This means that
communications from non-control group employees to counsel are not covered by
the attorney-client privilege in these jurisdictions, apparently without the adverse
effects on the flow of information between client and counsel posited by Upjohn
and cited by the defense bar in reaction to the compelled-waiver policy.
On the international plane, most countries recognize some form of attorneyclient privilege. 223 However, the contours of the privilege differ-sometimes
drastically-around the globe. 224 "In today's world, where the same facts may
form the basis for worldwide litigation, the differences in disclosure rules from one
country to another may result in the creation of communications that, while
immune from disclosure in a foreign country, must be turned over to opposing
privilege at the
counsel in U.S. litigation. 2 25 In short, "[t]he gaps in the 226
international level present a major problem for general counsel.
In sum, if an investigation is to be launched, good practice demands that it be
done correctly-that is, without favor or prejudice in its conduct. Absent extraordinary circumstances, this counsels against "paperless" practices and other attempts
220. See Christopher Scott D'Angelo & Robert P. Blood, The Scope and Use of the Attorney-Client Privilege
in the U.S. and Its Applicability to Communicationsat Home andAbroad, DEF. CouNs. J. 343, 348 & n.41 (2006)
(noting that as of 1997, at least, only fourteen states use "tests" based on or similar to that articulated in Upjohn,
eight states followed the "control group" test, and twenty-eight states, including Delaware, New Jersey, New
York, and Pennsylvania, had not articulated any particular test); see also Nancy Horton Burke, The Price of
Cooperatingwith the Government: Possible Waiver ofAttorney-Client and Work ProductPrivileges, 49 BAYLOR
L. REV. 33, 60 (1997) (elaborating on the use of the "control group test" by a number of states).
221. Brown, supra note 5, at 934.
222. See generally Hamilton, supra note 44, at 629-30; Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Lowest Common
Privilege, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 20, 2004, at 14.
223. See, e.g., Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilegefor In-House Counsel: A European Proposal,4
COLuM. J. EuP. L. 125 (1998).
224. See, e.g., AM. ASS'N OF CORP. COUNSEL, AKzo DELIVERS HIT TO EUROPEAN IN-HousE PRIVILEGE (2007),
http://www.acc.com/ (discussing cases by European Court of First Instance and European Court of Justice holding
that the legal professional privilege in the EU does not extend to communications between parties and their
in-house lawyers).
225. Fredrick M. Zullow & Rekha Ramani, Privilege is No Longer Simply a Domestic Issue: Care Should Be
Taken in Complex Litigations,as Foreign PrivilegeRules May Become a Factor,NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 2003, at
A31.
226. Joseph Pratt, The Parametersof the Attorney-Client Privilegefor In-House Counsel at the International
Level: Protecting the Company's ConfidentialInformation, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 145, 147 (1999).
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to manipulate the evidence likely to be uncovered or created during the course of
an investigation. And if, as is sometimes argued, the uncertainty in protection for
the results of the investigation mean that the investigation itself will be halfhearted, the many ways in which the privilege can be invaded or exploded
currently means that the investigations are likely to be compromised independent
of DOJ policy.
D. Will Employees Stop Talking to Counsel ifTheir Communications May be
Revealed?
All of the above rules limiting the applicability of the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine, and providing for their waiver in certain situations, are
also relevant to the other key assumption upon which Upjohn is based: that, absent
the protection of the corporateattorney-client privilege, corporate executives and
employees "will cease to be forthcoming out of a fear that whatever they
communicate will ultimately be disclosed, and corporate counsel will understandably be more skeptical of the accuracy or completeness of the information
communicated to them., 227 The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is
founded on assumptions regarding what "reasonable" persons will do in light of
known disclosure rules. Because we must therefore assume that we are dealing
with sophisticated, rational actors, the above-outlined uncertainties ought to cause
such persons to recognize that the extent to which they can confidently rely on the
privilege to protect their communications with corporate counsel in future is
questionable.
Those corporate agents who have no real worries about their own behaviori.e., those who are strictly witnesses-are not likely to be as influenced by
concerns about confidentiality as they are about their situation within the company.
Even if they are uncomfortable in a lawyer interview, or are hostile to the
investigation out of personal loyalty to those in hot water, employees faced with
the threat of employment consequences for a lack of cooperation have a strong
incentive to be helpful. As far as employees who are (or are likely to be) subjects or
targets of the investigation, there are more important reasons why employees who
have inculpatory things to say should be extremely wary of sharing fulsomely with
counsel-whether or not there is any prospect of a compelled-voluntary waiver
under DOJ policy. The first consideration for such persons is, of course, selfpreservation. An employee whose conduct has triggered sufficient concern to
prompt an internal corporate investigation is likely to know that (even if she
thought she had the green light or at least a wink and a nod encouraging her
allegedly wrongful activities) the Board is likely to very unhappy about the state of
events. Regardless of whether the employee contemplates that she might be
subject to criminal sanction, then, she may well be reluctant to share the ins and

227. Brown, supra note 5, at 900-01.
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outs of her alleged wrongdoing for fear of employment retribution.
Second, and more important, the simple fact is that employees do not control the
corporation's privilege; it would be an irrational actor, then, who would disclose
alleged wrongdoing to corporate counsel simply because she was asked. Professor
Brown states the case nicely:
[T]he privilege's principle justification-encouraging candor between attorney
and client so as to facilitate effective legal representation--on its face, appears
to have little application in the corporate environment. This is so because the
privilege, to the extent recognized, would belong to the corporation, as the
client, and not to its directors, officers and employees individually. Accordingly, there really is no personal incentive for corporate constituencies to be
candid with counsel. The confidential protection that is guaranteed is not
theirs; and hence, privilege purists would argue that these individuals would
most 22
likely
refrain from disclosing information that might reflect poorly on
8
them.

The Solicitor General made this argument in Upjohn but the Court ignored it; it
was wrong then, and it is even "wronger" now.
To understand why, further background may be appropriate. In 1980, as now, the
rule is that when a corporate employee makes a communication to counsel for the
corporation and the corporation later decides to waive applicable privileges, the
individual employee, with few exceptions, may not assert a privilege to shield his
communication from disclosure. 2 29 The irrationality of an employees' decision to
share all despite a lack of control over the privilege is even greater post-Upjohn,
though, because now there is little doubt that the witness will be warned, by
counsel, of this dynamic. There is widespread agreement that corporate counsel,
before interviewing corporate employees, must give what is commonly referred to
as an "Upjohn warning." Although expressed in different ways, the. warning
generally is as follows: (1) counsel represents the company-not the employeeand is interviewing the employee to gather information in order to provide legal
advice to the company; (2) the interview is confidential and covered by the
attorney-client privilege; (3) the privilege belongs to and is controlled by the
company; (4) because the company-not the employee-owns the privilege, the
company, but not the employee, may elect in future to waive any privilege and

228. Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
229. For example, in United States v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997), the
Second Circuit explained that
[r]ecognizing that entities can act only through agents, courts have held that any privilege that
attaches to communications on corporate matters between corporate employees and corporate
counsel belongs to the corporation, not to the individual employee, and that employees generally
may not prevent a corporation from waiving the attorney-client privilege arising from such
communications.
Id. at 215; see also In re Beviil, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1986).

2008]

PRIVILEGE WAIVER POLICY

1291

provide information derived from the interview to third parties, including prosecutors or regulators.230
Note that this warning is appropriate whether or not a corporation is contemplating a compelled-voluntary waiver. In other words, were DOJ's policy suspended
tomorrow, employees would still be advised of these facts. Why? First, one must
recall that disclosure to DOJ is not the only reason why corporations may wish to
waive the privileged nature of these interviews; as noted above, they may also
disclose the results of their investigations in response to business or regulatory
pressures. Second, and relatedly, the advice is given as much for the corporation's
benefit as out of any sense of obligation to the employee or ethical imperative for
counsel. Some courts "have been willing to allow corporate employees to assert a
personal privilege with respect to conversations with corporate counsel, despite
the fact that the privilege generally belongs to the corporation," 2 3' although the
employees bear a heavy burden in making such a claim and generally are
unsuccessful.2 32 Thus, the "Upjohn warning" is given to "prevent the employee
from later claiming to have believed the attorney represented the employee during
the interview, in an effort to invoke the attorney-client privilege and prevent the
company from disclosing the employee's statements" to others.23 3 Second, as
discussed above, corporate counsel recognize that it is in the entity's interest not to
unnecessarily alienate employees and other corporate constituencies in deciding
how to conduct the investigation. Accordingly, "corporate counsel will to some
extent have to consider whether it is 'only fair' to employees to warn them of their
234
peril ... in order to promote these other values of importance to their client.
With this as context, let us now return to the critical issue identified by the
Solicitor General in Upjohn: in the corporate internal investigations context, will
employees communicate facts to counsel that they otherwise would not absent the
protectionof a corporate attorney-clientprivilege? To, the extent that the extension
of the corporate privilege to these circumstances carries with it an obligation to
230. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr 1.13(f) (2004) ("In dealing with an organization's directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing."); Brown, supra note 5, at 938-39; Coleman, supra note 103, at
285; Finnegan, supra note 104, at 928-29; Reding & Han, supra note 103, at 454-55; Tuttle & Pierce, supra note
103, at 474; see generally Duggin, supra note 44, at 940-41 (surveying ethical rules applicable to corporate
counsel's interviews with employees).
231. Teamsters, 119 F.3d at 215.
232. An employee's unarticulated "reasonable belief' is not sufficient to confer upon the employee control of
the privilege. Id. at 214-16. The rationale is that "[t]his standard would provide employees seeking to frustrate
internal investigations with an exceedingly powerful weapon, and would stray quite far from the principle that the
attorney-client privilege should be 'strictly confined' in order to allow public access to 'every man's evidence."'
Id. at 216 n.2 (citations omitted). If such a privilege is to be claimed, the onus is on the employee to make it clear
to corporate counsel that he seeks legal advice on personal matters. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit,
Mich., Aug., 1977,434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
233. Finnegan, supra note 103, at 929; see also Reding & Han, supra note 103, at 454-55.
234. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, Golden Goose, supra note 211, at 1475.
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warn the witness that she does not own or control the privilege and that her
statement is confidential only so long as the corporation wishes it to be, the
privilege may actually inhibit fulsome communication. It is, in any case, difficult
to credit that the existence of a corporate privilege would reassure the rational
employee. At this point, the reasonable subject or target should be thinking only
about the privilege she owns (the Fifth Amendment) and how to use that privilege
to her advantage (or to minimize damage). We all know that many people are not
(entirely) rational actors and thus it may well be that the existence of the privilege
will give employees the (false) sense of security necessary to open up to corporate
counsel. But in these instances, it is not a rational reliance on the corporation's
attorney-client privilege that truly motivates employees. Rather, it is the threat of
being fired, combined with a misapprehension of their interests vis-di-vis those of
the corporation.
Even indulging an assumption that the "unreasonable" employee deserves some
accommodation, however, the advocates of the privilege must show that whatever
marginal additional disclosure is obtained through irrational employee choices
outweighs the efficiency and effectiveness advantages of a narrow or non-existent
attorney-client privilege in this context. As noted above, this they cannot do
because, given that counsel's conversation with the unreasonable employee would
otherwise be protected by work product in most cases, the effect of, and need for,
the attorney-client privilege-viewed alone-is indeed negligible.
VI.

ATrORNEY-CLENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION AS

FIFwH

AMENDMENT SURROGATE

My default position, as explained in the introduction, is that corporations and
their champions bear the burden of proving that DOJ's waiver policy, considered
alone, actually results in the "parade of horribles" they posit. This they cannot do.
Between educated guessing and my reading of some of the practice-oriented
literature, I believe that it is clear beyond peradventure that the Supreme Court
simply got it wrong in Upjohn. First, the attorney-client privilege is not necessary
to ensure that corporations continue soliciting legal advice or conducting competent internal investigations when allegations of wrongdoing arise. To the extent
that this was contestable in 1981, it is not today. Further, I think that the Solicitor
General had it right in Upjohn: extending the scope of the attorney-client privilege
in the internal investigation setting is unlikely to induce at least the rational
employee to share information with counsel that he would not otherwise disclose.
Again, the Supreme Court may have ignored this dynamic in 1980, but to do so in
today's environment would be a breathtaking victory of hope over experience. In
short, at least in this context, and measured only by the rationalesunderlying these
privileges-the privileges' "benefits are all indirect and speculative" but their
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235
"obstruction is plain and concrete."
Do these conclusions necessarily validate DOJ policy and/or invalidate the
defense bar's objections to it? No, because one simply cannot evaluate the effect of
the policy taken alone-that is, without reference to the entire context in which
corporate criminal practitioners operate. When that context is considered, the bar
does have valid reason for objection-just not the reason generally relied upon.
The deck is most definitely stacked against the corporation in criminal investigations. Three culprits are worth brief mention. The standards governing corporate
criminal liability are irrational and overbroad.2 36 Exacerbating this circumstance is
the nature of the federal criminal code; its overbreadth and elasticity mean that it is
not difficult to find something to hang on the corporation.23 7 Finally, the consequences of criminal convictions for corporations (including not only restitution
and fines, but also civil damages and de-licensing and debarment from government
contracting) are so harsh and wide-ranging that many public corporations have no
valid option but to prostrate themselves at the feet of any prosecutor who wanders
by. Which is why, I posit, the defense bar resists DOJ's compelled-voluntary
privilege waiver policy so vigorously: this invasion is the last straw because it
removes virtually the only means left to corporations to withstand the government
juggernaut.
To explain, we must examine how corporate defense counsel operate in an
environment that is so heavily weighted in favor of the government. In the
pre-charge stage, when most white-collar cases are viewed as won or lost, the
challenges facing defense counsel are: (1) divining, without the benefit of formal
discovery or other means of compelling the production of most types of information, what the government is investigating; (2) tracing or, with luck, keeping a step
ahead of the government in learning the facts; (3) limiting, consistent with ethical
and legal constraints, government access to incriminating evidence; and (4) using
the facts, law, and equitable arguments to persuade the government to decline
prosecution. Information control is the central function of the defense enterprise. 23 8 One therefore cannot evaluate the importance of the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine in the defense of corporate clients in
white-collar cases without understanding that corporationscannot claim a Fifth
Amendment right againstself-incrimination.

235. Brief for the United States, supra note 59, at 20 (citation omitted).
236. See, e.g, Julie R. O'Sullivan, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?A Response to ProfessorSchneyer s
Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1, 38-39 (2002) (collecting sources).
237. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, Code as Disgrace, supranote 211, passim.
238. See, e.g., KENNE
MANN, DEFENDING WtrTE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATroRNEYS AT WORK 5
(Yale Univ. Press 1985) ("But above all, and this is the central theme of the white-collar crime defense function,
the defense attorney works to keep potential evidence out of government reach by controlling access to
information."); Id. at 171 (quoting white-collar lawyer as stating "[m]y own belief is that the more information
you control as [a] defense lawyer, the more effective you are, meaning that the only weapon you have as a defense
lawyer in my view is control of information").
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Given the lack of a Fifth Amendment right, the only way that corporations have
any capacity to control information is to enlist lawyers to investigate the circumstances of alleged wrongdoing, ensuring that the information gleaned during both
the factual investigation and the legal evaluation of the corporation's position is
protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Practitioners' writings on the conduct of internal corporate investigations make one point
crystal clear: the true function the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine serve is to give the corporation a fighting chance of resisting a government investigation or at least to buy it breathing space to make a decision
regarding its best interests, not to encourage self-investigation or employee candor
or any of the other rationales traditionally said to underpin the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine.
In short, the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine have essentially
been enlisted in aid of another enterprise entirely-that is, filling in for the absence
of a corporate right against self-incrimination. Even the Solicitor General in
Upjohn understood this. Although unaddressed by the Court, a consistent theme in
the government's brief was the argument that the "subject-matter" test permitted
corporations to abuse the privilege:
[T]he overly broad subject matter test would encourage corporations to create
a 'zone of silence' around any information that has potential legal consequences by funneling such information through house counsel. Such manipulation of the attorney-client privilege and the use of corporate executives (such
as petitioner Thomas) who happen to be lawyers to perform what are
essentially non-legalfact gatheringtasks would undermine the legitimate right
of law enforcement agencies 'to satisfy themselves that corporatebehavior is
239
consistent with the law and the public interest.'

That the Solicitor General thought that this was an abuse of the privilege is evident
in its outraged mention that a former SEC Commissioner (of all people) had
recommended at a professional conference that any internal investigation conducted by a corporation into possible wrongdoing should be undertaken by outside
counsel and "at all events, it should not be undertaken by nonlawyers. 2 4 °
The Solicitor General was correct in arguing that the rationales underlying the
attorney-client privilege do not warrant its use in this way, but that does not, in my
mind, resolve the issue of whether the privilege is being "abused." The question
remains whether the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are
serving a useful, if unintended, purpose which warrants a reconsideration of DOJ
policy. The answer to this query depends on two further questions, the first of
which is whether one believes that the current imbalance between government and
corporations is good or bad. This is a topic that demands in-depth consideration
239. Brief forthe United States, supra note 59, at 16 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at41.
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that is beyond the scope of this article, but my initial reaction is that if we deem the
adversary system the best and fairest means of testing criminal culpability, it
should be a reality for all persons, real or legal.
The second question is, assuming that it is a bad thing that corporations are-as
is vehemently asserted by the defense bar--effectively denied the benefits of an
adversarial criminal process, what should be done about it? In absence of a
narrowing of corporate liability standards, an overhaul of the federal criminal
code, and a rethinking of the sanctions that can be visited upon corporations-all
of which seem unlikely-the fundamental problem will remain. And use of the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine as a stand-in for ihe Fifth
Amendment is, while not supported by the modem rationales underlying those
protections, consistent at least with one of the historical rationales underlying the
privilege: reinforcing a defendant's right to remain silent by preventing adversaries
from circumventing that right by calling counsel in his client's stead.2 41
VII. CONCLUSION

Using the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine as a stand-in
for the Fifth Amendment privilege to resist governmental investigations is far from
the perfect solution to the imbalance of power existing between corporations and
the government in the criminal sphere. The attempted substitution of these
protections for the Fifth Amendment right is ineffective in part because the rules
applicable to privilege and work product claims (such as the waiver rules) are not
crafted for this purpose. For example, while an individual defendant does not
waive his Fifth Amendment right for all purposes should he decide to tell his story
to a prosecutor, a corporation that attempts to share the results of its internal
corporate investigation will find that those results are now fair game--obtainable
by regulators, private plaintiffs, and the press. Instead of trying to jam a round peg
into a square hole (that is, by trying to resist privilege waivers on the basis of the
rationales underlying the privileges when they are being used for a different
purpose entirely), it would be better to attack the circumstances that essentially gut
the adversity of the criminal process in corporate cases. But, as noted, that
campaign is exceedingly unlikely to succeed.
It appears, then, that the defense bar is doing all it can to right the existing
imbalance by co-opting whatever arguments it can to maintain its one means of
resistance when the government comes knocking-claiming the protections of
work product and the privilege. DOJ has had no qualms about exploiting the
overbroad corporate criminal liability standards, the overbroad criminal code, and
the outsized sanctions- available, in service of its waiver policy. One could argue
that it is only fair that the defense bar be able to engage in similar hard-ball
tactics-that in view of the immense and dangerous advantages the government

241. See Brown, supra note 5, at 913.
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enjoys, the limited arsenal of weapons available to the defense, and the high stakes
involved (measured in millions of dollars and possibly the effect on innocent
corporate stakeholders), the defense bar's rearguard guerrilla warfare to maintain
some adversity in the corporate criminal context is not entirely inappropriate.
My own bottom line is this: I am not willing to concede defeat on attempting to
refocus the issues. If the amount of time, effort, and political good will that was
expended on this "Attorney-Client Protection Act" chimera were addressed to the
actual causes of the defense's problem-for example, if they caused Congress to
take a hard look at the over-extensive standard for corporate criminal liability-we
might actually achieve something. I hope, then, that the "Coalition to Preserve the
Attorney-Client Privilege" and the Congress will redirect their resources and
tackle the critical questions facing us: whether and how to reintroduce adversity
into corporate criminal cases.

